Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore by Friedman, Richard D.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 16
2001
Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore
Richard D. Friedman
rdf@rdf.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2001) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol29/iss2/16
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
TRYING TO MAKE PEACE WITH BUSH V. GORE 
 
Richard D. Friedman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 29 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811 (2001).  
811 
TRYING TO MAKE PEACE WITH BUSH V. GORE 
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN* 
 I. INTRODUCTION: THE SETTING AND THE ISSUES..................................................  811 
 II. THE POSTELECTION ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE................................................  815 
 III. DEADLINES...........................................................................................................  817 
 IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT .........................................................................  824 
 V. ARTICLE II: THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT...............................................  831 
A. Legislature Versus State Constitution .........................................................  832 
B. Legislature Versus Judiciary .......................................................................  836 
C. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post ................................................................................  839 
 VI. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS UNDER THE ARTICLE II LENS .....  841 
A. The Standard for Valid Votes and for Recounts .........................................  843 
1. The Substantive Standard.....................................................................  843 
2. Administrative Discretion......................................................................  849 
B. Extension of the Initial Deadline .................................................................  852 
C. Rendering the Earlier Stage Meaningless ...................................................  854 
D. Return to the Safe Harbor ............................................................................  856 
E. Summary.......................................................................................................  856 
 VII. HOW THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED .............................................  857 
A. Justiciability .................................................................................................  857 
B. The Statutory Framework ............................................................................  860 
C. Constitutionality of the Statutory Framework ............................................  861 
D. If There Had Been a § 5 Determination.......................................................  863 
E. Recounts Without a § 5 Determination ........................................................  866 
  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................  867 
I.   INTRODUCTION: THE SETTING AND THE ISSUES 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, shutting down the 
recounts of Florida’s vote in the 2000 presidential election and effec-
tively awarding the election to George W. Bush, has struck many ob-
servers, including myself, as outrageous.1 Decisions of the Supreme 
Court should be more than mere reflections of ideological or partisan 
preference thinly camouflaged behind legalistic language. It would 
therefore be pleasant to be able to believe that they are more than 
that. Accordingly, Judge Richard Posner’s analysis,2 in which he de-
                                                                                                                    
 * Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many 
thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Evan Caminker, Heather Gerken, Joel Goldstein, Rob 
Howse, Pam Karlan, Kenneth Katkin, Richard Posner, Terry Sandalow, Stephen Siegel, 
and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments, criticisms, suggestions, and encouragement. Spe-
cial thanks to Judge Posner for engaging in the e-mail discussion that eventually prompted 
me to write this Article, and to Evan Caminker for keeping me on track. Thanks also to 
Wade Gentz, Sean Hartigan, and Julie Rooney, and to Jenny Selby and other librarians at 
the University of Michigan Law Library, for very valuable research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Bush v. Gore: What Was the Supreme Court 
Thinking?, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 12, 2001, at 10; Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Dec. 25, 2000, at 18-21.  
 2. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
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fends the result reached by the Court—though not the path by which 
it got there—is particularly welcome. Though Judge Posner is a per-
son of conservative political orientation, he is also fiercely independ-
ent-minded. Given that he sees merit in the Bush decision, then per-
haps we can give more credence to the proposition that—whether ul-
timately we agree with the decision or not—it was a plausible re-
sponse to a difficult situation, rather than a flagrant act of judicial 
usurpation. 
 Ultimately, indeed, I am not persuaded by the arguments made by 
Judge Posner and others who have defended the Bush result as a 
prudential exercise of judicial power. In this article I will explain 
why I still believe the Court was wrong, way wrong. But I believe 
that Judge Posner and others have made a better argument for the 
Court’s result than the Court did itself. In particular, an argument 
under Article II of the Constitution, which only three members of the 
Court adopted, is stronger than the holding under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause that a majority of the Court adopted. I will attempt in 
this article to recast the Article II argument to make it even 
stronger; in my formulation, it is irrelevant whether the Florida Su-
preme Court relied exclusively on acts of the legislature in ordering 
recounts but significant whether that decision was a plausible appli-
cation of preexisting law. I remain unpersuaded that even this re-
formulated argument should have led to a shutdown of the Florida 
recount. I draw this conclusion in part because the Florida Supreme 
Court’s recount order seems clearly to have satisfied this standard. 
More fundamentally, the entire matter should have been left, as far 
as federal institutions are concerned, to the political process pre-
scribed by the Constitution and by federal statute. Thus, I continue 
to regard the Court’s intervention as a terrible mistake inimical to 
our democracy—guided in part by a partisan motivation that I hope 
was not close to the surface of judicial consciousness and in part by a 
misplaced sense that the nation was on the verge of chaos. And yet 
my sense of outrage is ever so slightly muted. I can at least see how a 
Justice with a perspective affected by a strong Republican rooting in-
terest might in good faith have regarded the decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court as intolerable and so been tempted to step in. 
 A brief summary of the situation as it stood on December 8, 2000, 
will help the reader understand the issues in Bush v. Gore and the 
plan of this article. The Secretary of State had certified the Republi-
can ticket as the winners of Florida’s electors, but on December 8 the 
Florida Supreme Court ordered a statewide manual recount of the 
                                                                                                                    
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK]; Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: The Election Dead-
lock and the Litigation That Ensued, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Posner, 
Florida 2000]. 
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undervote—that is, of those ballots containing no markings regis-
tered by the counting machines in the presidential vote.3 Governor 
(now President) Bush immediately petitioned the United States Su-
preme Court to review that decision. 
 There was considerable doubt as to whether such a recount could 
be completed in time to determine Florida’s electoral votes. A federal 
statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5, offered the state a “safe harbor”—if by Decem-
ber 12 it finally resolved its contest proceeding in the manner pre-
scribed previously by state law, then the determination made by that 
proceeding should have been immune from challenge under state 
law. But the deadline for the safe harbor was only four days away. 
Six days after that, December 18, was the date prescribed by law for 
the casting of electoral votes, in accordance with the requirement of 
Article II of the Constitution that the electoral votes be cast on the 
same day in every state. A statute provided that the electoral votes 
would be counted on January 6,4 and under the Twentieth Amend-
ment to the Constitution the new President was due to be inaugu-
rated on January 20.5 
 Beyond timing was the question whether the recount ordered by 
the Florida court was constitutionally valid. Governor Bush was rais-
ing two principal contentions. One was that the recount violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, mainly because the court had failed to es-
tablish uniform standards more specific than “the intent of the voter” 
for determining whether a ballot recorded by the machines as an un-
dervote should be deemed to have cast a valid vote. The other was 
that the state supreme court’s decision ordering the recount was not 
based on a valid interpretation of Florida election law, as enacted by 
the legislature, and therefore it violated Article II of the Constitu-
tion. Meanwhile, complicating the situation, the Republican-
dominated legislature was prepared to step into the situation and 
designate its own slate of electors. 
 Part II of this article will take up first (in large part because it is 
most easily detachable from other issues) the suggestion that at some 
point after Election Day the Florida Legislature could have picked a 
slate of electors or prescribed a method to pick them. I believe that 
the legislature quite clearly had no such authority. 
 In Part III, I address the question of deadlines. As others have 
recognized, Florida law did not clearly preclude the state from con-
tinuing any recount beyond December 12, whatever the circum-
stances. Beyond that, I contend that Judge Posner is incorrect in as-
                                                                                                                    
 3. THE WASHINGTON POST, DEADLOCK: THE INSIDE STORY ON AMERICA’S CLOSEST 
ELECTION 53 (Leonard Downie Jr. et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter WASHINGTON POST].  
 4. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).   
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
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suming, as apparently the dissenters in Bush v. Gore did, that de-
termination of which slate of electors Florida voters had selected 
needed to be completed by December 18, the date prescribed by fed-
eral law for electors to vote. In fact, though a timely determination of 
that matter by Florida would have simplified matters, Florida did 
not have to make a determination at all. The electors had to vote on 
December 18, but there is no bar against two slates voting on that 
date, with the matter to be resolved later. If the matter was unre-
solved before it came to Congress, then resolution would have been 
Congress’s responsibility. 
 Part IV agrees with and amplifies Judge Posner’s conclusion that 
the Fourteenth Amendment argument accepted by a majority of the 
Supreme Court was very weak and that it did not fit well with the 
shutdown of the recount ordered by the Court. 
 Part V examines the structure of the Article II argument, on 
which Judge Posner and other conservative jurists wish a majority of 
the Court had relied. 6 I agree with them, and with the three mem-
bers of the Court who would have decided the case on this ground, 
that a decision like that of the Florida Supreme Court requiring 
manual recounts does raise an Article II issue. But instead of em-
phasizing whether the Florida Supreme Court relied on sources other 
than legislation, or on whether the decision of that court was a usur-
pation of legislative authority, the critical Article II issue in this case 
depends on whether the decision of that court was a plausible one 
given the state of preexisting law. 
 The Article II argument nevertheless should not have prevailed. 
In Part VI, I contend that the Florida court’s decision to order re-
counts easily satisfied this plausibility standard. More fundamen-
tally, in Part VII, I argue that the entire matter should have been 
left to the political process prescribed by the Twelfth Amendment to 
the Constitution and by federal statute. At the most fundamental 
level, my disagreement with Judge Posner comes down to this: He 
believes that the Supreme Court made a wise and pragmatic decision 
to foreclose the possibility of a national crisis by intervening and 
shutting down the postelection process.7 I believe that the decision 
was an unnecessary and anti-democratic arrogation of power that 
prevented the election from being decided by the preordained politi-
cal process, which may have been long and contentious but which 
                                                                                                                    
 6. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The Florida Fiasco, THE 
NEW CRITERION, Mar. 2001, at 2-4, available at http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/ 
19/mar01/bork.htm; Charles Fried, ‘A Badly Flawed Election’: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14004. 
 7. That Bush v. Gore was an exercise of legal pragmatism, and that this is a virtue of 
the decision, are major themes of Judge Posner’s book. See POSNER, BREAKING THE 
DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 185-89. 
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would have produced a President without a breakdown in civil order. 
A pragmatic judge should accord an extremely high priority to the 
need to preserve democratic procedures for selection of the nation’s 
leaders. In Bush v. Gore the Supreme Court failed to do so. 
II.   THE POSTELECTION ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE 
 As the postelection battle dragged on, the Florida Legislature was 
poised to select its own slate of electors and presumably would have 
done so had the United States Supreme Court not put an end to the 
matter. Judge Posner believes that the Legislature may have had the 
authority to do so.8 
 Such authority would be based on Article II of the Constitution, 
which provides that “[e]ach state shall appoint” electors “in such 
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” and on 3 U.S.C. § 2, 
which provides: 
 Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of 
choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day pre-
scribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day 
in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.9 
 On examination, though, it becomes quite clear that the legisla-
ture has no authority after the election to devise a new plan for se-
lecting electors or to select them itself. 
 Article II provides that Congress may determine a uniform date 
for all electors to be selected throughout the nation.10 Congress did so 
in 1845, providing a national election day for the first time—then as 
now the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.11 In con-
sidering the statute, however, Congress realized it had a problem: at 
least one state, New Hampshire, then provided that a majority of 
voters was necessary to select a slate of electors. Thus, as a Con-
gressman from that state pointed out, “it might so happen that no 
choice might be made” on Election Day.12 To preclude this result, 
Congress included in this one-paragraph statute the provision now 
                                                                                                                    
 8. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 55 (speaking of “options that 
[Bush] possessed to thwart a recount that went against him, notably the option of the Flor-
ida legislature’s appointing its own slate of presidential electors”); Posner, Florida 2000, 
supra note 2, at 5 (similar); see also POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 
133 (“At some point continued uncertainty about the outcome of the November 7 election 
might be deemed a failure to have chosen electors on that day, in which event the Florida 
legislature could select its own slate . . . .”); Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 43 n.69 
(similar). 
 9. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing 
the Electors . . . .”). 
 11. Act of Jan. 23, 1845, 5 Stat. 721 (1845) (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)). 
 12. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1844) (remarks of Rep. Hale). 
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codified immediately afterward as 3 U.S.C. § 2.13 If the state holds an 
election on the prescribed day but “fail[s] to make a choice,” it does 
not forfeit its electors; rather, it may hold a runoff on a later day.14 
 The statute cannot reasonably be understood to have meant that 
if the state holds an election on Election Day but it turns out that the 
result is really, really close and takes some time to resolve, then the 
Legislature may step in and choose a slate of electors without regard 
to what happened on Election Day.15 No one in Congress suggested 
that this was the intent or meaning of the statute. Elections are often 
very close and not resolved on Election Day; indeed, in 2000 Florida 
was not the only state in which the outcome remained in doubt until 
well after November 7. That the winner has not been determined 
conclusively by midnight on Election Day, only a few hours after the 
polls close, or even by a much later time, does not mean the state has 
failed to make a choice on that day. It only means that the responsi-
ble state officials have not yet ascertained what choice the people of 
the state made on Election Day. 
 Certainly the 1845 statute sets out no standard or procedure for 
determining whether an election is so close or difficult to determine 
that the people of the state should be deemed to have “failed to make 
a choice” on Election Day.16 Thus, if § 2 were deemed to authorize a 
legislature to pick a slate of electors whenever the election was too 
close to call, any time that a legislature purported to exercise this au-
thority supporters of the losing candidate would be sure to contend 
that the decision was a usurpation of power, because the winner of 
the election might yet have been determined in good order. This is a 
recipe for chaos.17 
                                                                                                                    
 13. See id. (remarks of Rep. Hale, suggesting “that provision might be made for such a 
contingency”); id. at 21 (sponsor offering amended bill, providing for contingency, in terms 
substantially similar to those now in 3 U.S.C. § 2). 
 14. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 15. Though I regret to say I suggested earlier, in a CNN chatline conducted before I 
understood the background of the statute, that such a theory might be valid. Law Professor 
Richard Friedman: The Latest on the Election 2000 Legal Proceedings (Dec. 7, 2000), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/community/transcripts/2000/12/7/friedman/ (on file with 
author). Live and learn. I am grateful to Professor Kenneth Katkin, whose e-mail of De-
cember 7, 2000, to a discussion list for constitutional law professors, on file with the au-
thor, set me straight. 
 16. The gap cannot be filled by construing the “safe harbor” provision, 3 U.S.C. § 5 
(1994), to set a time after which section 2 authorizes the legislature to choose electors; sec-
tion 5 was not enacted until 42 years after section 2, in the Electoral Count Act of Feb. 3, 
1887, 24 Stat. 373. 
 17. Note that Congress rejected an amendment to the Election Day bill that, as one 
member described it, would have given “concurrent jurisdiction” to the electors of a given 
state and to the legislature to fill vacancies among the electors; as that member said, 
“those two bodies being of different political opinions, the election might be negatived en-
tirely, and no election take place.” CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1844). 
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 The essential point of the 1845 statute was to create a uniform 
national election day. It would make no sense—either in advancing 
that goal or in achieving any sense or perception of fairness—to pro-
vide that, just because an election contest could not be resolved 
quickly, a legislature could nullify the election and select the state’s 
electors itself.18 Section 2 should be construed as limited to the con-
tingency that called it forth: if a state selects its electors by popular 
election but requires more than a simple plurality for the selection, 
then there is a chance that the election held on Election Day will 
produce no winner, and so notwithstanding Congress’s attempt to 
provide for a uniform election day, the state may in that case hold a 
subsequent proceeding to select its electors. 
III.   DEADLINES 
 Under Article II of the Constitution, electors throughout the na-
tion must cast their votes on a single day, chosen by Congress.19 The 
date prescribed by Congress—perhaps with a touch of whimsy?—is 
“the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December” after the 
election,20 which in 2000 was December 18. Under another statutory 
provision, 3 U.S.C. § 5, if before Election Day a state provides a pro-
cedure “for its final determination of any controversy or contest” con-
cerning the appointment of electors and that determination is made 
at least six days before the time fixed by law for the meeting of the 
electors, then the determination is conclusive when the electoral 
votes are counted before Congress.21 Thus, December 12 was the 
deadline for Florida to conclude its contest if it was to take advan-
tage of this “safe harbor.” Finally, 3 U.S.C. § 15, which provides for 
the counting of the electoral votes by Congress, set January 6, 2001, 
as the date for the count to commence.22 
 So, then: By when did Florida have to decide who—so far as it was 
concerned—had won the state’s electors? It is obvious that, so far as 
                                                                                                                    
 18. At the time of the statute, the electors of one state, South Carolina, were still cho-
sen by the state’s legislature. The sponsor of the bill made it clear that, though the prior 
practice of the legislature had been to meet in December, the legislature would have to be 
in session to choose electors on the designated day. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 
14 (1844) (statement of Rep. Duncan) (“[N]o difficulty could occur in [South Carolina], for 
its legislature could be convened every fourth year on the day to be fixed by the bill, to dis-
charge the duties therein prescribed.”); see also, e.g., id. at 28 (Rep. Campbell of South 
Carolina). 
 19. “The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on 
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 20. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994). 
 21. Id. § 5. 
 22. Id. § 15. January 6 is the standing date provided by the statute. Occasionally, 
Congress has passed special statutes selecting another date for a given count, see, e.g., id. 
(Supp. V 1999), but this time around it stayed with the standing date.  
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federal law is concerned, Florida did not have to make a decision by 
December 12. By its terms, § 5 gives the state an option: If a process 
prescribed by the state complies with the terms of the statute, one of 
which is the deadline, then the determination yielded by that process 
is conclusive in the count of the electoral vote. If the state does not 
satisfy the statute, it does not forfeit its electoral votes. Rather, that 
simply means that the determination of the winner of the state’s 
electors is contestable in Congress. Section 15 provides a rather 
elaborate procedure, which I shall discuss in Part VII, for resolving 
the contest in that case. 
 It does appear that the Florida Supreme Court, without confront-
ing the issue, operated under the assumption that Florida law re-
quired adherence to the December 12 deadline, at least in the ordi-
nary instance.23 Chief Justice Wells of the Florida Supreme Court, 
dissenting from the court’s order requiring a statewide recount, 
thought it clear that the majority was insisting on December 12 as a 
deadline.24 And the United States Supreme Court, making a rather 
expansive reading of vague language from the Florida court’s opinion 
of November 21,25 treated the matter as if Florida law were not only 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Perhaps the strongest expressions of the Florida court on this matter came in 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000), after remand 
from the Supreme Court. The Florida court said: 
 What is a reasonable time required for completion [of a manual recount] will, 
in part, depend on whether the election is for a statewide office, for a federal of-
fice, or for presidential electors. In the case of the presidential election, the de-
termination of reasonableness must be circumscribed by the provisions of 3 
U.S.C. § 5, which sets December 12, 2000, as the date for final determination of 
any state’s dispute concerning its electors in order for that determination to be 
given conclusive effect in Congress. 
Id. at 1286 n.17. And later in its opinion, the court said: 
As always, it is necessary to read all provisions of the elections code in pari ma-
teria. In this case, that comprehensive reading required that there be time for 
an elections contest pursuant to [Florida Statutes] section 102.168, which all 
parties had agreed was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and to 
accommodate the outside deadline set forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5 of December 12, 
2000. 
Id. at 1290 n.22; see also infra note 25 (reference to failure to comply with § 5 as prevent-
ing full participation of Florida voters in election). The United States Supreme Court did 
not cite these passages in Bush v. Gore—perhaps because the Florida court’s opinion was 
issued just a day before Bush. 
 24. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev’d 
sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (“The safe harbor deadline day is December 12, 
2000. Today is Friday, December 8, 2000. Thus, under the majority’s time line, all manual 
recounts must be completed in five days, assuming the counting begins today.”). 
 25. The Florida court said that excluding late returns was proper only if including 
them would “compromise the integrity of the electoral process,” which it could do in two 
ways, one of them “by precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the federal elec-
toral process.” Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
The court then cited generally 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10, without specifying or discussing the “safe 
harbor” provision. Id. at 1237 n.55. In its decision of December 8, however, the court spoke 
more specifically, referring to the Department of State’s discretion to reject late-amended 
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clear but absolute on the matter. When the election dispute first 
reached the Court, the Justices had punted the case back to the Flor-
ida court, professing uncertainty in Bush v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Board (“Bush I”) as to the basis for the Florida court’s opin-
ion.26 Eight days later, on December 12 in Bush v. Gore (“Bush II”),27 
having held that the recount as ordered by the Florida court was 
constitutionally defective, the Court showed no such reticence. The 
Florida Supreme Court had decided that December 12 was the dead-
line, that date had come, and so it was impossible to complete a valid 
recount in a timely manner.28 Game over. The Court did not bother to 
ask the Florida court to determine whether that court construed 
Florida law to make qualification for the safe harbor the preeminent 
goal, so that, if the only way to conduct a constitutionally permissible 
recount required abandonment of that goal, the recount could not be 
held. It is at least plausible that, given the chance, the Florida court 
would have held that manual recounts, for which the Florida election 
code provides in extensive detail,29 took precedence over the safe har-
bor, which the election code does not even mention. 
 Judge Posner also finds the Supreme Court’s invocation of the De-
cember 12 deadline unpersuasive and even distasteful, decrying its 
“‘Gotcha!’ flavor.”30 But he suggests that December 18 was in fact the 
deadline for Florida to resolve the dispute over selection of its elec-
tors. The Bush II dissenters appear to agree, as does Charles Fried.31 
I do not. 
 All electors had to vote on December 18, because the Constitution 
says that the date for electors to vote shall be the same throughout 
the nation and that is the date that Congress selected.32 But this does 
not mean that any provision of federal law required that the electors 
be certified by that date as having been elected. Usually, of course, 
certification occurs well before that date. Indeed, 3 U.S.C. § 6 pro-
vides that it “shall be the duty” of the executive of the state “as soon 
                                                                                                                    
returns if failure to do so would “result in Florida voters not participating fully in the fed-
eral electoral process, as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5.” 772 So. 2d at 1290. 
 26. 531 U.S. at 78. 
 27. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 28. Id. at 110. 
 29. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 149-52. 
 30. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 150-51 (“The remedy decreed 
by the five-Justice majority . . . has a ‘Gotcha!’ flavor, as if the U.S. Supreme Court had 
outsmarted the Florida supreme court by nailing that court with its perhaps unconsidered 
suggestion that December 12 was indeed the deadline under Florida law for designation of 
the state’s electors . . . .”); Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 48 (similar). Similarly, 
Dean L. Kinvin Wroth, who wrote on the Electoral Count Act four decades ago, said the 
day after the election that the Supreme Court majority “played ‘gotcha’” with the “safe 
harbor” deadline. William Glaberson, The 43rd President: The Legal Issues; Concession on 
‘Deadline’ Helped Seal Gore’s Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A24. 
 31. See 531 U.S. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting); Fried, supra note 6. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
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as practicable” after final ascertainment of the results of the election, 
to send a certificate of ascertainment of the electors chosen to the Ar-
chivist of the United States, and that “it shall also thereupon be the 
duty” of the executive, “on or before the day on which they are re-
quired . . . to meet,” to deliver six duplicate originals of that certifi-
cate to the electors.33 The better interpretation, I believe, is that the 
executive’s duty to deliver certificates to the electors is made subject 
to the practicability standard; if it is impractical to certify the results 
beforehand, then the executive is not duty-bound to make the deliv-
ery. 
 In any event, if the executive fails, whether excusably or not, to 
make timely delivery, that does not mean that the state forfeits its 
electoral votes. Of course, timely certification makes much easier the 
job of Congress in counting the electoral vote; if there is a lawful cer-
tification and only one slate of electors votes, then usually there is no 
room for dispute.34 This statute cannot reasonably be understood to 
require forfeiture of the state’s electoral votes if the executive was 
late in delivering a copy of the certificate to the electors, or even if 
the executive was late in certifying the results. At most, the statute 
authorizes the two Houses to reject votes if the votes were not regu-
larly given by electors whose appointment was legally certified. It 
seems dubious that a late certification should be grounds for denying 
a state its votes. As explained below, if two slates of electors vote, 
and there has been no “safe harbor” determination, there is no doubt 
that Congress not only may, but should, count the votes (if regularly 
given) of a slate that the two Houses agree was the properly elected 
one, even if that slate has not been certified at all. It would be 
anomalous if the votes of a slate that was properly elected, but not 
certified, would count if another slate also voted on the designated 
day, but not if no other slate voted then. I conclude that if only one 
slate from a state votes on the designated day, and the votes are 
regularly given, Congress should decline to count their votes only if 
the two Houses determine not only that their appointment was not 
properly certified but also that they were not in fact elected. But two 
or more slates of electors can vote on the designated day, and it is 
then the job of Congress to determine which, if any, of the votes shall 
be counted. Indeed, 3 U.S.C. § 15 explicitly provides for Congress’s 
consideration of multiple slates and allows the possibility that Con-
                                                                                                                    
 33. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994). 
 34. Id. § 15 provides that: 
no electoral vote or votes from any State which have been regularly given by 
electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified according to section 6 of 
this title from which but one return has been received shall be rejected, but the 
two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that 
such vote or votes have not been so regularly given by electors whose appoint-
ment has been so certified. 
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gress will determine itself that a given slate was properly elected, 
even though that slate was not certified by the executive of the 
state—and even though another one was.35 Thus, it is the responsibil-
ity of the two Houses to determine which slate was “appointed in ac-
cordance with the laws of the State,”36 and so far as federal law is 
concerned that determination does not require certification at all. In-
deed, if the two Houses agree, they can accept one slate even though 
another slate has been certified by the executive under seal, as pre-
scribed by § 6. 
 On one occasion in the modern era, in Hawaii in 1960, two com-
peting slates have indeed met and voted on the designated date.37 
The state of Hawaii first certified the Republican slate as the win-
ners of the 1960 election but reversed itself after both slates voted 
and after the completion of a recount ordered by a state court over a 
protest that the completion would be too late for federal law.38 This 
case is particularly interesting because the Democratic slate, the one 
that was accepted, received no certification before it voted.39  
                                                                                                                    
 35. That statute provides that if there is more than one purported return from a state, 
and there has been no “safe harbor” determination,  
then those votes, and those only, shall be counted which the two Houses shall 
concurrently decide were cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with 
the laws of the State, unless the two Houses, acting separately, shall concur-
rently decide such votes not to be the lawful votes of the legally appointed elec-
tors of such State. But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of the count-
ing of such votes, then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose ap-
pointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the 
seal thereof, shall be counted. 
Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. The only other occasion since passage of the Electoral Count Act on which two 
electoral slates submitted returns occurred in Oregon in 1888, the first election after pas-
sage of the Act. There was no serious dispute, however. 20 CONG. REC. 1, 1860 (1889). One 
slate was certified by the Governor and the other appears to have been a prank or the work 
of a crank. E-mail from Professor Stephen Siegel to discussion list for constitutional law 
professors (March 22, 2001) (on file with author). Many thanks to Professor Siegel for pro-
viding information on this and other double-return incidents. 
 Before passage of the 1887 Act, there were double-return incidents in Louisiana in 1872 
and in 1876, and in Florida, South Carolina, and Oregon in 1876. In the 1872 Louisiana 
case, the entire election was marked by scandal and fraud, see W. DEAN BURNHAM, 
PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTS: 1836-1892, at 115-16 (1955), and Congress, being unable to decide 
which return—one certified by the secretary of State and another by the Governor—was 
valid, rejected both. L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L. 
REV. 321, 329-30 (1961); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1302-03 (1881). Four years 
later, with the state still in political chaos, it again sent double returns to Congress, and 
the Electoral Commission approved the Republican slate. In the 1876 Florida case, the 
Democratic electors received only an irregular certification before they voted and a certifi-
cation from the new Governor afterward; in the South Carolina case, the Democrats ap-
parently had little claim to victory and met and voted to keep up appearances. PAUL 
LELAND HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876, at 155 
(1906). 
 38. Wroth, supra note 37, at 341. 
 39. In the 1876 Florida case, the Electoral Commission concluded that it  
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 Judge Posner is correct that the case lacks dispositive preceden-
tial value. Hawaii’s votes did not affect the outcome of the national 
election. The President of the Senate, Richard Nixon, was the losing 
Republican candidate for President, doing his best to operate in gra-
cious mode.40 So that the count would not be delayed, and “without 
the intent of establishing a precedent,” he suggested without objec-
tion that Congress accept the electors certified after the fact by the 
Governor “as the lawful electors from the State of Hawaii.”41 
 Despite Nixon’s obvious purpose simply to dispose of the matter 
quickly, the incident has considerable value for present purposes. 
There does not seem to have been any doubt at the time that Hawaii 
had valid electoral votes despite the fact that two slates voted on that 
date; the only question was which slate was valid. There is some sig-
                                                                                                                    
is not competent under the Constitution and the law, as it existed at the date of 
the passage of [the Act creating the Commission, which charged the Commis-
sion with deciding according to then-existing law], to go into evidence aliunde 
the papers opened by the president of the Senate in the presence of the two 
houses to prove that other persons than those regularly certified to by the gov-
ernor of the state of Florida, in and according to the determination and declara-
tion of their appointment by the board of state canvassers of said state prior to 
the time required for the performance of their duties, had been appointed elec-
tors, or by counter-proof to show that they had not, and that all proceedings of 
the courts or acts of the legislature or of the executive of Florida subsequent to 
the casting of the votes of the electors on the prescribed day, are inadmissible 
for any such purpose.  
ELECTORAL COUNT OF 1877, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND OF THE 
TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS IN JOINT MEETING RELATIVE TO THE COUNT OF ELECTORAL 
VOTES CAST DECEMBER 6, 1876, FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM COMMENCING MARCH 4, 1877 
(1877), at 196, available at http://moa.umdl.umich.edu/cgi/sgml/moa-idx?notisid=ABF0865 
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. 
 The Commission’s vague reference to the Constitution has little weight; nothing in the 
Constitution addresses how the identity of the electors shall be ascertained, apart from the 
provision that they shall be appointed in the manner determined by the legislature. And, 
as indicated above, the statutory framework has changed; 3 U.S.C. § 15 clearly provides in 
some settings for Congress to make its own determination of which slate was elected. 
 Furthermore, in the Oregon case, the Commission did go behind the certificate of the 
Governor, though it did not have to recanvass returns. HAWORTH, supra note 37, at 166. 
The Republicans won the contest for the state’s three electoral votes, but one of the candi-
dates for elector was ineligible because he was a postmaster. The Governor, a Democrat, 
took the position that the votes cast for that elector were void, and he certified as the win-
ning elector the fourth vote-getter, a Democrat. Id. at 165. The Republican electors took 
the view that their colleague had been validly elected but was ineligible to serve, so they 
filled the vacancy themselves and refused to cooperate with the Democratic elector, who 
appointed substitutes of his own. Id. at 157-67, 250-61; PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 640-41. 
The Oregon resolution is consistent with the result reached in the 1872 Louisiana case. A 
committee appointed by Congress to investigate those returns determined that “it would be 
proper for Congress to go behind the governor’s certificate to determine whether a legal 
canvass had been made,” but that “Congress itself could not canvass the votes without 
usurping the state’s constitutional powers.” Wroth, supra note 37, at 329-30. 
 40. Note his farewell remarks to Congress, after the completion of the count, lacking 
any suggestion that this was the Members’ last chance to kick him around. 107 CONG. REC. 
1, 291 (1961). 
 41. Id. at 290. 
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nificance in this light to the fact that Nixon spoke of “the” lawful 
electors; he was clearly operating under the assumption that there 
were some. In an analysis written shortly after the event, L. Kinvin 
Wroth, now Dean of the University of Vermont Law School, said that 
if Hawaii’s votes had been outcome-determinative, “Republican objec-
tions to the acceptance of the decree as binding would have been 
sound, whatever their fate in a Democratic Congress.”42 Wroth does 
not suggest that, if Hawaii’s votes had mattered, accepting the De-
mocratic slate would have been an improper outcome, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the slate was certified after it voted. He only con-
tends, and properly, that in that setting the Governor’s certification 
of that slate should not have been accepted as binding: competing 
slates of electors had voted, and the state had made no “safe harbor” 
determination, so it would be up to Congress to determine which 
slate of electors was the valid one. Though the Governor’s certifica-
tion would certainly play a role in that determination, it would not be 
binding on Congress. But no one seems to have doubted that one 
slate or the other should be counted or that the Democratic slate 
could validly be counted even though it was not certified before it 
voted. 
 I posed the question when Florida had to decide who—so far as it 
was concerned—had won the state’s electors. The real answer is that, 
though it would simplify matters if Florida decided early, the state 
was not absolutely compelled to decide at all. If the election contest 
was finally resolved by December 12 in satisfaction of the “safe har-
bor” provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5, then that resolution would be binding 
on Congress. If—as ultimately happened—there was no such final 
resolution of the contest43 but the executive lawfully certified a slate, 
that slate voted as prescribed by law, and it was the only one to send 
a return of its vote to Washington, then, too there would be nothing 
for Congress to decide. But if there was no resolution of the contest 
satisfying the safe harbor and two or more slates voted on December 
18, then it would be for Congress, in the vote count beginning on 
January 6, to decide, in accordance with the procedure set out in 3 
U.S.C. § 15, which slate was properly elected. Congress would not be 
                                                                                                                    
 42. Wroth, supra note 37, at 342. 
 43. In Bush II, issued on the evening of December 12, the Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the case “for further proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). The Florida Supreme 
Court ordered dismissal of the case on December 14 and issued an explanatory opinion on 
December 22. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000). Thus, the case was not finally 
disposed of on December 12. And, though as a political matter, the decision of that date 
was the coup de grace for Vice President Gore, it did not resolve all legal issues. It would 
have been possible for Gore to argue on remand that the United States Supreme Court had 
misunderstood Florida law and the Florida Supreme Court’s statements about that law, 
and that in fact that law allowed a recount to extend beyond December 12 if that was the 
only constitutional way to conduct one. 
824  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:811 
 
bound by any decision made by one state official or another. The two 
Houses could assess the validity of recounts recently completed or 
still in progress, and perhaps if they wanted to do so—not that it 
would necessarily be a good idea—they could even supervise their 
own recount.44 
 Reading the Electoral Count Act, as I have argued it should be 
read, to allow counting of a slate that voted on the designated date 
even though it was not certified by that date squares with the history 
and purpose of the statute as well as its language, and yields an ap-
pealing result. Early certification is optimal, and the statute requires 
it when it can be done feasibly. But Congress enacted the statute 
with the recognition that sometimes the states would not be able to 
resolve the disputes in a timely manner, that multiple slates might 
vote on the designated date, and that sometimes resolution of the 
dispute might be left to Congress. The electors vote nearly three 
weeks before Congress begins to count the vote, and that is nearly 
two weeks before Inauguration Day. It would be an unfortunate re-
sult if a given slate voted on the designated date in mid-December, 
and by the time Congress began to count the vote, or shortly after, it 
became clear that this was the properly elected slate, and yet its 
votes could not count because state officials had not certified it before 
it voted. Such a result does not square with precedent, and the Elec-
toral Count Act does not require it. 
IV.   THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 Notably, some leading conservative jurists, including Judge Pos-
ner and Robert Bork, have disdain for the principal ground on which 
the United States Supreme Court held the manual recounts in Flor-
ida unconstitutional.45 The critical issue in counting the Florida votes 
was that many punch-card ballots did not have holes punched 
through cleanly enough to be recorded by the counting machines as 
casting a vote for President but nevertheless had enough of a punch 
that arguably they provided an indication of the voter’s intent. The 
Florida Supreme Court held that these “undervotes” should be re-
                                                                                                                    
 44. I believe this is an open question. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Bork, supra note 6 (“[T]hese and similar disparities have always existed 
within states under our semi-chaotic election processes. By raising that to the level of a 
constitutional violation, the court federalized state election laws. The opportunities for un-
certainty, litigation, and delay in close elections seem endless, which is probably why fed-
eral courts have never entered this particular briar patch before. Once the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is unleashed, it will apply to every federal, state, and local election in the coun-
try”); see also POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 128. Charles Fried 
speaks more favorably about the Equal Protection holding, but nevertheless concludes that 
“the three concurring Justices, whose views Professor Dworkin does not discuss, were on 
sounder ground than the seven who found an equal protection violation.” Fried, supra note 
6. 
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counted manually, a vote to be counted if there was a clear indication 
of the intent of the voter.46 But application of this standard differed 
from one canvasser to another, and even from one time to another, 
and the Florida Supreme Court did not elaborate on when the “intent 
of the voter” should be deemed established with sufficient clarity to 
treat a ballot as validly cast. Primarily for this reason, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the recounts as ordered by the Flor-
ida court violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection of the law.47 According to the majority, this general test 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 47. There were other grounds as well, but I believe they were less substantial. First, 
in selected counties, all the ballots were recounted but the recount ordered throughout the 
rest of the state by the Florida Supreme Court covered only the undervote. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. at 107. One concern is that different counties had different categories of votes re-
counted, but this appears to be insubstantial. The Florida law governing the protest phase 
provided that a manual recount will not be held at all in a given county except on request 
of a candidate, a political party, or (in the case of an issue on the ballot) a political commit-
tee. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(4) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 151-52. The 
law thus allowed for the possibility that recounts will be held in some counties. But no 
candidate, committee, party, or voter ever challenged this system. Another concern ap-
pears to be that certain categories of ballots were counted in a given county but not others. 
Thus, there may have been some voters whose ballots were improperly counted because 
they punched two holes but the machine only read one, and those ballots would not be re-
counted. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 107-08. Well, perhaps, but there could not have been 
very many of these ballots, and to discover them would require reviewing every punch-card 
ballot in the state; neither candidate was complaining about these, and neither was asking 
for a full recount. The Florida Supreme Court should have been entitled to restrict the re-
count to categories of ballots that appeared most likely to present problems. A similar re-
sponse applies to the fact that the recount ordered by the Florida court would not address 
the “overvote”—cases in which the ballots had been deemed to indicate votes for two presi-
dential candidates and so were treated as not casting a valid vote for any candidate. Id. 
The overvote problem is not symmetrical with the undervote problem, which appeared at 
the time to be the principal problem and was the one pressed by the Democrats. It is far 
more likely that a voter will (a) make a marking sufficient to yield a clear indication, on 
manual inspection, of intent to cast a vote but insufficient to be read by the machine, than 
that the voter will (b) cast a valid vote by punching out one hole but make a marking that 
(i) would be read by the machine as a second hole, therefore invalidating the vote, (ii) but 
on manual inspection would not affect the clear inference of intent to cast a single vote. 
Ironically, though, it now turns out that there was a far more significant overvote problem, 
one that may have turned the election for Vice President Gore if he had timely complained 
about it. A significant number of votes were apparently invalidated because they had a 
hole punched and a write-in indication—even though the hole was punched for the Democ-
ratic ticket and the name written in was Gore’s. But the Gore team apparently did not 
learn about this problem early enough to request a recount on the basis of it. POSNER, 
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 80; Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 16 
n.15. 
 Second, the Court interpreted the Florida decision as allowing a partial recount of a 
county to be included in the total if time to conduct the recount ended before the count 
could be complete. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 108. The Court’s interpretation of the Florida 
decision is far from an inevitable one. But in any event, this was clearly a premature con-
cern. There was no way of knowing when the Supreme Court made its decision whether 
the Florida court would in fact be confronted with a partial recount of a county when the 
recount had to be halted. 
826  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:811 
 
was constitutionally inadequate given “the absence of specific stan-
dards to ensure its equal application.”48 Judge Posner’s assessment of 
this holding, which he says he does “not find . . . compelling,” is 
worth quoting at some length, notwithstanding his own aversion to 
long block quotations:49 
The conduct of elections, including federal elections, has been con-
fided to local government—to counties and indeed, to a consider-
able extent, to precincts. Different counties in the same state often 
use different equipment, methods, ballots, and instructions, gener-
ating different sources and rates of error. Ballots often are counted 
differently in different precincts, and, what is perhaps more impor-
tant . . . , differently when they are counted at the county level 
rather than at the precinct level. Such differences had not previ-
ously been thought to deny equal protection of the laws. If they are 
now to do so, this portends an ambitious program of federal judi-
cial intervention in the electoral process—a program the Supreme 
Court seems, given the haste with which it acted, to have under-
taken without much forethought about the program’s scope and 
administrability.50 
 This response, I believe, is right on the mark. Outside the context 
of this case, one would not have expected the Court to embark on 
such an ambitious program of supervising the technical aspects of 
electoral administration and counting. The majority decision is not a 
natural outgrowth of prior doctrine, and it does not appear that it 
will be a fruitful generator of future doctrine. 
 In addition, Judge Posner mounts an argument that—though ul-
timately it may not deny the possibility that any person had standing 
to complain about disparate standards, a matter with which the 
Court seems to have been very unconcerned51—puts the equal protec-
                                                                                                                    
 Finally, the Court expressed concern about the procedures under which the recounts 
would be held—the ad hoc nature of the counting teams, some of whom “had no previous 
training in handling and interpreting ballots,” and the inability of observers to object. Id. 
at 109. The Court did not explain why these concerns would amount to a constitutional vio-
lation, nor did it suggest constitutional standards of procedure such as prescribed training 
for counters or a requirement that in some circumstances observers be allowed to object. 
Certainly the Florida procedure was rough-and-ready, but if a recount was proper, those 
procedures would not make the recount contemplated by the Florida Supreme Court worse 
than none at all. 
 48. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. 
 49. See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1421, 1424 (1995) (“[G]o easy on quotations, especially long block quotations.”). 
 50. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 128; see also Posner, Florida 
2000, supra note 2, at 41. 
 51. The Court did not pause to ask whether any petitioner was a voter whose ballot 
was not counted but would have been counted under more generous standards applied in 
another county. Pamela Karlan has argued that there were no plaintiffs who both had 
standing and would have their claims remedied by the shutdown ordered by the Supreme 
Court. Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Change-
able Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & 
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tion argument in an unappealing light. “If my dimple was not 
counted in the original election and yours was,” he asks, “what ex-
actly is my complaint?”52 Neither ballot, in his view, should have 
been counted, and absent invidious discrimination (which was not 
shown), the counting of one ballot and not the other does not give the 
disfavored voter ground for complaint.53 I am not as sure as he is that 
such a ballot should not have been counted,54 but clearly three mem-
bers of the majority thought it should not have been, because that 
proposition is one of the foundations of their concurrence based on 
Article II of the Constitution.55 If one person receives a government 
benefit, another person who is similarly situated but does not receive 
that benefit may have a valid equal protection claim even though nei-
ther person had a right to the benefit. But if the law should have pre-
cluded the granting of the benefit, then the force of the claim is much 
diminished. 
 The Bush II majority relied on the Due Process Clause as well as 
on the Equal Protection Clause, though the per curiam opinion of the 
majority did not focus much on it or articulate the holding very well. 
Judge Posner has more sympathy for the due process holding than 
for the equal protection holding. According to him, the Florida Su-
preme Court’s refusal to adopt a specific standard for the recount, 
while accepting recounts from Broward and Palm Beach Counties 
that were based on methodologies inconsistent with each other, “can 
fairly be described as irrational,” even perhaps as the near equiva-
lent of ballot-box stuffing.”56 But even here Judge Posner is hesitant, 
for “the creation of a federal duty to use uniform precise criteria in a 
recount” “would not be “an inconsequential doctrinal step.”57 
 I find the variation in standards allowed by the Florida Supreme 
Court more tolerable than does Judge Posner, and a fortiori more 
than does the Bush II majority. Greater tolerance of variation should 
have been enough to reject both the equal protection and the due 
process arguments. Many standards that the law uses every day—for 
example, “beyond a reasonable doubt” and just about any test invok-
ing a reasonable person—are subject to wide variation in application, 
                                                                                                                    
Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the 
Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1357-64 
(2001). 
 52. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 129. 
 53. Id.; Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 41. He also asks, “Or if I was a good boy 
and punched my chad clean through, and you only dimpled your chad, what is my com-
plaint if your dimple is counted as a vote . . . ?” Id.  
 54. See infra Part VI. 
 55. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118-20 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 56. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 131; Posner, Florida 2000, 
supra note 2, at 42. 
 57. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 131; Posner, Florida 2000, 
supra note 2, at 42.  
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and yet the law is satisfied to apply such standards without further 
definition. 
 The Bush II majority recognized this point; indeed, it said: “The 
law does not refrain from searching for the intent of the actor in a 
multitude of circumstances; and in some cases the general command 
to ascertain intent is not susceptible to much further refinement.”58 
But this case, in the Court’s view, was different. The search for in-
tent was limited to the evidence on the face of the ballot and so could 
be “confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treat-
ment.”59 In other words, the problem was not so much that the intent 
standard was excessively vague as measured against some absolute 
measure of precision. Rather, the problem was that the standard was 
more subject to variation than it needed to be; Florida had forsaken 
an opportunity for precision. 
 Certainly uniform rules could be developed, but they would not 
necessarily be very good rules for determining a voter’s intent. Even 
on the face of a single ballot, there is an infinite range, across several 
dimensions, of evidence bearing on the intent of the voter. How much 
of the chad is left attached, and where? If it is attached, how deeply 
indented is it? What patterns of punches and indentations are there 
elsewhere on the ballot? What markings, if any, are there?60 Any 
simple rule by definition will exclude relevant information from the 
inquiry and so inevitably lead to inaccurate determinations. Any 
complex rule will inevitably lead to variations in application, even if 
one entity makes all the decisions; ask anybody who has to perform a 
recurring task of any complexity, such as calling balls and strikes 
throughout a baseball game,61 grading a set of law school essay ex-
ams, or trying to replicate a pasta sauce. The variations are inevita-
bly greater if decisions are made separately by numerous deci-
sionmakers. 
 All of which is not to say that trying to come up with more specific 
rules would have been imprudent. Perhaps it would have been a good 
idea. But the Florida statute, as understood by the Florida court, ar-
                                                                                                                    
 58. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Consider also write-in votes. What indication is sufficient for the write-in to be 
treated as designating a given ticket, thus allowing the ballot to be counted (and not to be 
invalidated if the voter also punched the hole for that ticket)? Only the full names of both 
candidates, as listed on the ballot? One surname? Sufficient information to indicate with 
reasonable certainty whom the voter intended? Ultimately any standard short of the intent 
of the voter may be inadequate to capture some ballots that were clearly intended to cast a 
vote for a given ticket. Thanks to Evan Caminker for this point. 
 61. See Tom Zeller, The Strike Zone’s Connected to the . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, § 
4, at 3 (describing major league baseball’s attempts to discourage umpires from the “fash-
ion” of “employing multiple strike zones of varying dimensions throughout the course of 
nine innings”). 
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ticulated only a general standard, and that was a constitutionally 
valid choice. It was a similarly valid, though clearly debatable, choice 
by the Florida Supreme Court not to embellish on the standard that 
it perceived in the statute, leaving the determination of how the 
standard would apply in individual cases to the persons charged with 
making those applications. 
 The Court’s emphasis on the unused opportunity for precision 
helps explain one of the most curious aspects of the opinion. Clearly, 
the Court recognized one vulnerability of a holding based on lack of 
uniformity in standards for determining the validity of a vote. Differ-
ences between one county and another in determining what consti-
tuted a sufficient indication of the intent of the voter paled in com-
parison to the differences among counties in voting systems. Indeed, 
optical scanning systems appeared to be so much better than punch 
cards at ensuring that intended votes were recorded—at least when 
the ballots were scanned at the precinct immediately after being 
completed—that the manual recount of punch-card undervotes may 
be regarded as an attempt to minimize this disparity. But the Court 
could not demand true uniformity in election mechanisms across a 
state: that would not only be a judicial project of almost unimagin-
able scope, but it would render invalid the vote in many states. The 
question, the Court said, 
is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may 
develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we 
are presented with a situation where a state court with the power 
to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal 
procedural safeguards. When a court orders a statewide remedy, 
there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary re-
quirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satis-
fied.62 
 In other words, the Florida court could have done better to assure 
uniformity, given that it alone or the trial court under its supervision 
(rather than multiple decisionmakers) was in control of the statewide 
recount, and so it should be held accountable for not doing better. 
The reasoning has a Procrustean feel to it, as if it were drawn just to 
satisfy this case—an inference strengthened by the Court’s emphasis 
that its “consideration [was] limited to the present circumstances.”63 
Only “in the special instance of a statewide recount under the au-
thority of a single state judicial officer” did the Court’s demand for 
uniformity apply.64 If, as had occurred during the initial protest 
phase, several counties held recounts under different supervisory of-
                                                                                                                    
 62. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
830  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:811 
 
ficials and applied different standards, that would apparently not be 
a problem. For that matter, it appears that if state law authorized 
the Secretary of State to require a statewide recount, and she al-
lowed her delegees to apply the intent standard in a differential 
manner, that would not be a problem, because she is not “a judicial 
officer.” But these distinctions seem to make little sense. The legisla-
ture, in establishing statewide rules, can delegate broad authority to 
local officials to refine, on a case-by-case basis, a broad statutory 
standard, and nothing in the Bush II opinion suggests that it cannot. 
Why, then, does the Fourteenth Amendment prevent a court with 
statewide supervisory power from doing the same thing, leaving it to 
local officials to implement a legislatively prescribed standard on a 
case-by-case basis? And, looked at from the other side: if the judicial 
refusal to articulate a more precise standard was unconstitutional 
because a single decisionmaker supervising the process could articu-
late such a standard, why is the legislative tolerance of vastly differ-
ent voting systems acceptable, given that the legislature could if it 
wished mandate a uniform system statewide? 
 In short, though variations from county to county, or from ballot 
to ballot, as to what constituted a vote were unfortunate, and though 
perhaps the Florida Supreme Court should have acted more aggres-
sively to limit them, they are to some extent inevitable and in any 
event should not be held unconstitutional. Perhaps Bush II will dis-
tort decisionmaking in the lower federal courts.65 But I think it 
unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will ever use the 
case—really use it, not just include it in a string cite—to strike down 
another application of state election law as insufficiently uniform. 
The majority’s Fourteenth Amendment rationale was a disposable 
tool crafted for use on one occasion.66 
 And yet, ironically, the tool did not even do the job for which it 
was made. The Bush II majority’s Fourteenth Amendment holding 
has one other notable defect, emphasized by Judge Posner. If the re-
counts ordered by the Florida Supreme Court failed to satisfy the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the remedy one would ordinarily expect 
would be a remand to give that court an opportunity to order consti-
tutionally satisfactory recounts. But instead the Court shut the re-
counts down. As I have already indicated, and as Judge Posner 
                                                                                                                    
 65. This is Judge Bork’s prediction. Bork, supra note 6, at 3. 
 66. So I’ve come up with another metaphor, which I think fits the case somewhat bet-
ter than the two that are sufficiently inevitable to have to quote but sufficiently clichéd to 
put in a footnote. Lambert v. Call, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(expressing confidence “that the present decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation 
from the strong current of precedents—a derelict on the waters of the law”); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s 
decision, by overruling a recent case, tends to bring decisions of the Court “into the same 
class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only”). 
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agrees, the stated reason for this remedy—that satisfactory recounts 
could not be completed in compliance with the “safe harbor” provision 
of 3 U.S.C. § 5—is not persuasive. The Florida court should have 
been given the opportunity to determine whether later recounts 
should be held given that the Supreme Court decision made this the 
only way to hold a recount. Judge Posner suggests that the shutdown 
may still have been justified by the Fourteenth Amendment holding 
because it would not have been possible to complete a recount com-
plying with the Supreme Court’s standards, and judicial review of it, 
by December 18, the date on which the electors voted.67 Even if that 
factual premise is true—and I believe it is somewhat speculative—
the Supreme Court certainly did not justify its decision on this basis. 
And in any event, as I have already shown in Part III, it was not in 
fact necessary that the proceedings be concluded by December 18. In 
sum, bridging the gap between a holding that the recounts ordered 
by the Florida court were defective and a decision effectively barring 
further recounts required something close to pure judicial fiat. 
 Could there have been a better way? 
V.   ARTICLE II: THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
while helping to form a majority in support of the Fourteenth 
Amendment holding, would have barred the recounts on a different 
ground as well. In their view, the decision of the Florida Supreme 
Court requiring the recounts “impermissibly distorted” Florida’s elec-
tion laws “beyond what a fair reading required,”68 and thus violated 
Article II of the Constitution, which provides that each state shall 
appoint electors “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may di-
rect.”69 Judge Posner finds this ground of decision more attractive 
than the Fourteenth Amendment holding, as does Judge Bork.70 
Without confronting the question whether he actually believes the 
Article II argument was correct as a matter of law, Judge Posner be-
lieves it is sufficiently plausible to support what he regards as the 
Court’s act of judicial statesmanship in ending the contest.71 
 Before approaching the merits, it is apparent that an Article II 
holding would have two significant advantages over the Fourteenth 
Amendment holding. First, as Judge Posner points out, if Article II 
precludes a construction of state law authorizing manual recounts in 
the circumstances of the case, then the appropriate remedy is to bar 
                                                                                                                    
 67. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 136-37. 
 68. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 70. Bork, supra note 6, at 3. 
 71. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 166.  
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the recount.72 There would be no reason to give the Florida Supreme 
Court an opportunity to conduct a permissible recount—for no re-
count would be permissible. Thus, the remedy that the United States 
Supreme Court actually adopted, shutting down the recount, would 
link up with the substantive basis of the decision, which it did not do 
with the Fourteenth Amendment holding. 
 Second, if an Article II holding was a misconstruction of law, it 
would at least be a narrowly focused one. If the Fourteenth Amend-
ment holding were taken seriously, it would distort the law of the 
Fourteenth Amendment so far as it governs elections, and even more 
generally; thus, I have predicted that it will probably be ignored. By 
contrast, an Article II holding may never become relevant again, and 
if it does it would be in the context in which it arose—election of the 
President. 
 But is there merit to an argument that Article II precluded the re-
count? In this section, I examine the structure of such an argument. I 
conclude that Article II does impose constraints on how a state may 
select the manner in which it appoints its electors and even the 
manner in which it determines which electors have been appointed. 
In Bush I, the first case before the Supreme Court, the Court sug-
gested that the state constitution cannot limit legislative choice on 
these matters.73 That is true to some extent, I acknowledge, but it 
has no real bearing on this case. In his concurrence in Bush II, the 
Chief Justice drew a sharp distinction between judicial and legisla-
tive action. That, too, is significant in some settings, but I contend 
that this distinction as such is not significant here. It does correlate, 
however, with the one factor that I do believe is significant here, and 
which is also apparent in the Chief Justice’s concurrence—whether 
the state action in question can plausibly be considered consistent 
with preexisting law. 
 In Part VI, I contend that, under this standard, the recount or-
dered by the Florida Supreme Court should have been upheld. And 
in Part VII, I contend that in any event the United States Supreme 
Court should not have reached the merits, instead leaving the matter 
to be decided by the political process prescribed by the Constitution 
and by federal statute. 
A.   Legislature Versus State Constitution 
 Article II prescribes that each state shall choose its electors in 
such manner as the legislature shall direct. “Not as the state shall di-
rect,” as Judge Posner points out, “but as the state legislature shall 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Id. at 156.  
 73. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2000).  
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direct.”74 In McPherson v. Blacker, the Supreme Court declared that 
Article II “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the 
method” of appointment.75 The Court characterized the power as 
“plenary”76 and quoted with apparent approval a Senate report stat-
ing, “This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by 
the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from 
them or modified by their State constitutions any more than can 
their power to elect Senators of the United States.”77 
 In Bush I, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ex-
pressed concern on this score. The case addressed the Florida Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of Florida law to allow county canvass-
ing boards a greater time to file their returns than the Secretary of 
State had permitted. The Justices remanded the case on the pur-
ported ground that they were “unclear as to the extent to which the 
Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscrib-
ing the legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.”78 
 On the other hand, dissenting in Bush II, Justice Stevens said 
that Article II “does not create state legislatures out of whole cloth, 
but rather takes them as they come—as creatures born of, and con-
strained by, their state constitutions.”79 And he was able to point to a 
well-founded distinction in the way the Court has treated the Consti-
tution’s mentions of state legislatures. Where the legislature is act-
ing in a lawmaking capacity, it is subject to the usual constraints 
imposed by the state constitution on its making of law. Thus, the leg-
islature’s power under Article I, Section 4 to prescribe the “time[ ], 
place[ ], and manner” of elections for Congress does not relieve it of 
the usual obligation of presenting its prescriptions to the governor for 
signature or veto80 or of a state’s provision that acts of the legislature 
be subject to review by referendum.81 By contrast, when the legisla-
ture is asked to make a “binary decision,”82 as when it is asked to “act 
as a ratifying body” in considering constitutional amendments under 
Article V,83 such constraints do not apply;84 pointing thumbs up or 
                                                                                                                    
 74. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 109; see also Posner, Florida 
2000, supra note 2, at 29. 
 75. 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892). 
 76. Id. at 25, 35. 
 77. Id. at 35 (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)). 
 78. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78; see also id. at 77 
(quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25, that the language of Article II “operat[es] as a limita-
tion upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power . . . .”). 
 79. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 80. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367-68 (1932). 
 81. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916).  
 82. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 83. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365. 
 84. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (holding that state referendum re-
quirement does not apply to ratification under Article V). At least one legislative decision 
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thumbs down to a presumptive decision made elsewhere is not mak-
ing law in the usual sense. And it seems quite clear, as Justice Ste-
vens contended, that in determining the manner in which electors 
are to be appointed under Article II, the legislature is acting in a 
lawmaking capacity akin to that under Article I, Section 4.85 
 Can the lines of cases on which Justice Stevens relies be recon-
ciled with the principle asserted by McPherson and endorsed by Bush 
I? I believe that they can be. The distinction between substance and 
procedure—however creaky it may be in other contexts—serves well 
here, at least as a first cut and if we give the terms special meanings 
for this context: substance refers to the manner of selection pre-
scribed by the legislature and procedure to the process by which the 
legislature makes the prescription. In fact, this distinction has 
guided state court decisions governing both Article I, Section 4 and 
Article II: The state constitution may make the ordinary procedures 
for the enactment of legislation applicable to the legislature’s deter-
mination of the manner in which members of Congress are chosen or 
electors are appointed, but it may not restrict the manner of ap-
pointment that the legislature selects.86 If it makes changes to the 
state’s election laws, such as in the definition of the class of eligible 
voters, applicable to elections generally, those changes will presump-
tively be applicable to presidential elections. But that is only as a de-
fault matter. The legislature remains free to prescribe a different 
rule for selection of presidential electors.87  
 Thus, for example, if the state constitution makes presentation to 
the governor for signature or veto a prerequisite for all legislation, 
that requirement may constitutionally be applied to the legislation 
determining the manner in which electors shall be appointed; in that 
                                                                                                                    
under the original Constitution—the election of Senators—could not be considered either 
lawmaking or binary; Smiley spoke of the legislature as “an electoral body” in performing 
this function. 285 U.S. at 365. 
 85.  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also James C. 
Kirby Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 503 (1962). 
 86. Kirby, supra note 85, at 503-04 (drawing a distinction “between how and what” 
and showing that case law adheres to it). 
 87. Note the following language from the Senate report quoted by McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)): “Whatever provisions 
may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there 
is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can nei-
ther be taken away nor abdicated.” This passage acknowledges that a state constitution 
might make provisions, such as determining the qualifications of voters, that are substan-
tive in the sense I have used that term—governing the manner of selection of electors 
rather than the process by which the legislature prescribes how electors are to be se-
lected—and that presumptively would apply in presidential elections. If, as this passage 
indicates, such provisions are to be treated only as default rules, subject to defeasance for 
presidential elections by ordinary legislation, then they do not operate as constraints on 
the legislature. 
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respect, as Justice Stevens says, “Article II takes the legislature as it 
comes, created by and operating under the procedures established by 
the state constitution.”88 Those procedures may include participation 
by the governor and even, at least arguably, by the people in a refer-
endum. Article II does not, however, designate the state as a mono-
lith to determine the manner of appointment. It designates the legis-
lature. And the legislature, however broadly conceived it may be for 
these purposes, is an entity or group of entities capable of making 
law—in contrast to the state constitution, which is a body of law. 
Suppose, then, that the state constitution forbade felons to vote. If 
the legislature, operating under the authority granted it by Article II 
rather than by the state constitution, decided that this limitation 
should not apply in voting for presidential electors, the legislative 
choice should prevail.89 
 However this general issue should eventually be resolved, it has 
little or nothing to do with decisions affecting the 2000 presidential 
election. The Florida Supreme Court did not interpret the election 
code to be in conflict with the state constitution and then hold that 
the latter invalidated the former. In Gore v. Harris,90 the December 8 
decision that was reviewed by Bush II—and the decision that really 
mattered, in which it ordered the statewide recount—the Florida 
court, taking the hint from Bush I, avoided reliance on constitutional 
sources altogether. Even in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. 
Harris,91 the November 21 decision reviewed by Bush I, in which it 
extended the deadline for counties to file their returns, the court did 
not perceive such a conflict. Rather, it interpreted the code in light of 
general principles found in the state constitution and elsewhere. It 
made perfect sense to do this. This is especially so given that, in the 
respects here relevant, the election code did not differentiate between 
presidential and other elections. One would expect the code to be 
                                                                                                                    
 88. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123. 
 89. Referendums pose an interesting problem. Suppose the legislature passed a stat-
ute allowing felons to vote and the people then rejected the statute in a referendum. Pre-
sumably Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916), which upheld the valid-
ity of a referendum in the context of Article I, Section 4, would extend to this situation as 
well. The referendum could be considered part of the legislative process in the manner of a 
veto. But now suppose the referendum operated against an old statute, or on a blank 
slate—that is, state law previously said nothing about felons being ineligible to vote. Then 
it is harder to consider the referendum part of the process by which the legislature makes 
law; rather, it seems the referendum is a different lawmaking process, and its participants, 
the people of the state, are a lawmaker different from the legislature. Arguably, though, 
even in this situation, Article II’s reference to the legislature should include the referen-
dum. The referendum is part of the ordinary, or at least generally authorized, lawmaking 
process, and perhaps it is that process rather than the particular body to which Article II 
refers. 
 90. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 91. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
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drafted, or in any event to be subject to being construed, in accor-
dance with the state constitution. To hold that the legislation accords 
with the constitution is not to hold that the constitution constrained 
legislative choice. Thus, it could not have been particularly surpris-
ing when, asked on remand to explain the basis for its decision, the 
court was able to reach the same result without relying on constitu-
tional sources. 
B.   Legislature Versus Judiciary 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush II made much of 
the distinction between courts and the legislature,92 as does Judge 
Posner.93 There is a considerable irony in the Chief Justice’s empha-
sis on the distinction. Part of his professed concern for the need to 
protect legislative prerogatives was based on the perception that the 
legislature had sought the “safe harbor” offered by 3 U.S.C. § 5, 
which as noted above requires that the state’s final resolution of a 
contest concerning the selection of its electors be made in accordance 
with previously established procedures.94 But nothing on the face of 
the Florida election code refers to § 5; it is only references by the 
Florida Supreme Court that suggest as a matter of state law that the 
legislation should be understood, at least in ordinary circumstances, 
to seek protection of the “safe harbor.”95 
 That the Chief Justice’s’ invocation of the legislative/judicial dis-
tinction may be suspect does not mean that the distinction lacks 
force under Article II. Once again, I believe Article II does draw such 
a distinction, but it is less important than might appear at first, in 
part because it correlates to a considerable extent with a distinction 
that is more consistently important and that is more relevant to 
Bush II—that between before-the-fact and after-the-fact lawmaking. 
 At least at the extreme, Article II must limit the role of state 
courts in a way that it does not limit the role of state legislatures. 
Suppose that some time before Election Day, the legislature deter-
                                                                                                                    
 92. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“This inquiry does not 
imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed 
role of state legislatures.”). 
 93. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 159-60 (“[T]he ‘Manner di-
rected’ clause of Article II can be used to curb such abuses by confining the authority to 
make the rules for the appointment of the state’s Presidential electors to the organ of gov-
ernment that operates prospectively, which is the legislature. Courts operate retrospec-
tively.”); see also Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 53. 
 94. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113 (“If we are to respect the legislature’s Article II 
powers . . . we must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the legis-
lative desire to attain the ‘safe harbor’ provided by § 5.”). 
 95. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. In any event, the state’s desire to 
qualify for the safe harbor is a matter of state law. It should not add anything to an argu-
ment for federal intervention under Article II. 
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mined that the election as planned would be unfair and that the 
situation could not be remedied in time, that it enacted a statute 
providing that it should select the electors itself, in the old-fashioned 
way, and that on Election Day it did just that. Presumably this 
would be permissible; at least nothing in Article II precludes the leg-
islature from doing so.96 But now suppose instead the state supreme 
court held that the election as planned would be unfair, that state 
common law or constitutional law empowered the court to fashion an 
appropriate remedy, and that the appropriate remedy was that the 
court itself should choose the electors on Election Day. Even assum-
ing the court has the power to enjoin the conduct of the election as 
planned—a plausible hypothesis, at least if that conduct would vio-
late the Federal Constitution—it seems inadmissible to hold that Ar-
ticle II authorizes the court to select its own method of appointing 
the electors. The Constitution explicitly gave the power to determine 
the manner in which electors are chosen to the organ of government 
most subject to popular control. We cannot assume that mention of 
the legislature was haphazard, so that another part of state govern-
ment can exercise the function. 
 On the other hand, courts obviously have a role in applying the 
law governing the selection of electors, because the legislature—
including that of Florida—typically gives the courts such a role.97 In-
deed, Congress has assumed that the courts would likely be accorded 
such a role: the “safe harbor” provision98 explicitly recognizes that a 
state may select a judicial tribunal as the ultimate decisionmaker 
within the state in resolving a contest concerning the selection of 
electors, and if that decision is timely the statute makes its determi-
nation binding upon Congress. It would be not only impractical but a 
substantial intrusion on state authority if every decision of the state 
supreme court concerning state election law in a presidential election 
were subject to de novo federal review. Clearly, as the Chief Justice 
acknowledged, the interpretations of the state supreme court are en-
titled to substantial deference.99 
 Moreover, just as presentment to the executive is part of the 
lawmaking machinery of each state, interpretation by the judiciary 
may be considered to be as well. Suppose that on its face a provision 
of the state’s election code, applicable to elections in general, ap-
                                                                                                                    
 96. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1892) (emphasizing that the legisla-
ture may resume the selection of electors at any time, and noting that the selection of elec-
tors by the Colorado legislature in the 1876 election was unchallenged, despite the heated 
controversy surrounding that election). 
 97. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (2000) (judicial proceeding to contest election), amended 
by 2001 Fla. Laws. ch. 40, § 44, at 153-54. 
 98. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 99. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
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peared clearly not to make the fact that an election was close suffi-
cient grounds for ordering a manual recount—but that there was 
well-settled judicial precedent, developed over many years in cases 
involving nonpresidential elections, allowing recounts for that rea-
son. Under any realistic understanding of what the law was as of the 
time of Election Day, it allowed such recounts. In a close contest for 
presidential electors, then, adherence to the law would seem to allow 
the recounts; Article II should not be deemed to require the state 
courts, or the United States Supreme Court, to disregard the estab-
lished interpretation and rely only on the statutory text as if the in-
tervening history had not occurred. 
 Now compare a hypothetical involving alteration of the law not 
before the election by the judiciary but after the election by the legis-
lature. Suppose the election code and judicial interpretations of it 
were very clear that closeness of an election was not a sufficient 
ground to order a manual recount—and that shortly after a very 
close election the legislature changed the law to provide retroactively 
that manual recounts should be held whenever the election satisfied 
prescribed standards of closeness. Such an intervention, albeit legis-
lative, is an attempt to alter the results of the procedure for selecting 
electors as established by the legislature before Election Day, and it 
should be constitutionally precluded.100 
 Indeed, it appears—uncomfortable as it may have made counsel 
for Vice President Gore to assert it before the Supreme Court101—
that after the election the courts have more legitimate room than 
does the legislature to refine the standards for determining whom 
the state selected as its electors on Election Day. The legislature can 
only make new law; it has no role in interpreting statutes already on 
the books.102 The judiciary, by contrast, is charged with interpreting 
and applying preexisting statutes. Sometimes, we know, the judici-
ary must confront a situation in which, perhaps because the law did 
not anticipate it, it is not clear what the governing principle of law is. 
And yet the judges must decide, and they should try to articulate 
reasons supporting their decision. For this reason, if for no other, 
judges must sometimes establish principles that were not clearly un-
derstood beforehand as stating the law. The performance of that role 
is legitimate, if for no other reason than that it is inevitable. 
                                                                                                                    
 100. See infra Part V.C. 
 101. See Bork, supra note 6, at 3 (“Counsel for Gore was put in the untenable position 
at oral argument of contending that the Florida court could make postelection changes in 
the law that the legislature could not.”). 
 102. Note the famous remark of Rep. James A. Garfield to Rep. John A. Bingham: “My 
colleague can make but he cannot unmake history.” CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 
App. at 151 (1871). 
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 In short, I am suggesting that the relative standing under Article 
II of state judicial and legislative decisionmaking that bears on the 
selection of the electors depends to a significant extent on timing. Be-
fore the election, judicial decisionmaking is less likely to be valid, be-
cause the legislature is the organ of state government designated by 
Article II to select the means by which electors are appointed.103 After 
the election, judicial decisionmaking is if anything more likely to be 
valid. At that point, the problem is likely not to be determining the 
basic means of selection, but rather refining and applying the previ-
ously articulated principles for determining which electors were in 
fact the victors on Election Day. Thus, the concern with after-the-fact 
lawmaking takes preeminence. That, then, is the concern that is 
most relevant to the dispute in the 2000 election dispute, which arose 
once the polls were closed. 
C.   Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
 The Florida decision reviewed in Bush v. Gore was issued after 
Election Day. Ex post, or after-the-fact, decisionmaking raises Article 
II concerns that ex ante, or before-the-fact, decisionmaking does not. 
If the decision is so significant that it could be deemed a change in 
the manner in which the state selects its electors, so that the state 
should be deemed not to have chosen its electors before the time of 
the decision, then the decision could violate the prescription of Arti-
cle II that Congress may choose a date, as it has done, on which all 
states should choose electors. 
 More basically, a concern arises even if the decision is deemed 
only to affect the manner in which the state determines what choice 
it made on Election Day. Fundamental fairness precludes the state 
from making outcome-decisive changes in the rules for determining 
the winner of an election contest after the contest itself has been 
held. Such a principle has been found in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.104 But Article II, addressing the selec-
tion of electors, is a more focused forum for it, and that is the forum 
in which it has been discussed in the context of the 2000 election.105 
Article II clearly implies that the legislature must “direct” the man-
                                                                                                                    
 103. That does not mean that the judiciary has no valid role then. For example, a court 
may properly grant injunctive or declaratory relief resolving the meaning of an unclear 
statutory provision. But the judiciary would be limited to fair interpretations; unlike the 
legislature, it could not properly devise a new method of selection. 
 104. Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th  Cir. 1995). 
 105. I do not believe it much matters whether the issue is posed in terms of due process 
or Article II or both—except that the federal interest may be more apparent in the Article 
II context (this is the President being elected, not a sheriff), and the concern might appear 
more readily justiciable to the extent it is phrased in terms of due process. I suggest below, 
however, that even for the justiciability purpose the characterization should not matter. 
See infra note 182. 
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ner of appointment of electors before the state appoints the electors. 
A corollary is that, under the rules for determining the outcome as 
they stood on Election Day, if one candidate’s slate of electors should 
be declared the winners, the rules should not be changed during the 
determination process in such a way that leads to declaration of an-
other slate as the winners. This principle seems to underlie the re-
quirement of 3 U.S.C. § 5 that, for a state’s contest-resolution process 
to qualify for “safe harbor” status, it must be established before Elec-
tion Day.106 
 I have already suggested a hypothetical that highlights the impor-
tance of this principle. Suppose that, as of Election Day, state law 
was very clear that a manual recount could not be held simply be-
cause an election was close. Article II should prohibit the state from 
changing the law after a presidential election to provide that manual 
recounts could indeed be held in that election merely because the 
election was very close—and this prohibition should apply whether 
the change in law is effected by the legislature or by the courts. 
 The problem, of course, is that the law is not always so clear with 
respect to issues that arise in the counting of votes, and those issues 
must be resolved one way or another. Suppose that state law said 
nothing at all about manual recounts, and simply prescribed that all 
contests over the results of elections would be resolved by the judici-
ary. Then Article II should not inhibit the state courts from deciding 
one way or the other as to whether the recounts should be held. 
 Or suppose that there were decisions by the lower courts, or a pat-
tern of administrative practice, limiting the circumstances in which 
manual recounts should be held, but the state supreme court had 
never ruled on the matter. Article II probably should not be con-
strued to prevent the state supreme court from resolving the issue 
for the first time in the context of a contest over presidential electors, 
and doing it contrary to the prior sources of law. A supreme court is 
in place to be the ultimate expositor of the jurisdiction’s law. It 
should not be bound by the decisions of inferior tribunals (though 
perhaps it owes them enough attention to determine whether they 
carry persuasive value) or precluded from resolving an issue for the 
first time in a contest in which that issue might matter more than 
ever before. 
 Finally, suppose that, in the eyes of a federal decisionmaker at-
tempting to enforce Article II,107 prior sources of law that should con-
strain the state supreme court—legislation and the court’s own deci-
sions—tend to point in a given direction but do so with some ambigu-
                                                                                                                    
 106. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 107. For now, I am not addressing the question whether that decisionmaker should be 
in Congress or on the Supreme Court. 
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ity. Here again Article II should probably not be read to compel the 
state supreme court’s choice. Legal doctrine, we all know, is often 
open-textured and debatable. Article II should not become a tool to 
federalize state law concerning disputes in determining the results of 
the state’s election for presidential electors by depriving state courts 
of the usual leeway to decide difficult cases. 
 Thus, while Article II should be understood to pose some re-
straints on the results that a state court can reach in resolving such 
disputes, the restraints must not be tight. Unless the principles ap-
plied by the court amount to a clearly implausible construction of 
state law as the law stood on Election Day, there should not be an 
Article II problem. 
 Interestingly, this standard is not far from the one prescribed by 
the Chief Justice in his concurrence; he asked whether “the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida election laws imper-
missibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in vio-
lation of Article II.”108 That opinion reflected a concern with the re-
spective roles of the judiciary and the legislature as well as with af-
ter-the-fact decisionmaking.109 I have argued in this Part that the 
former concern as such should not have been a significant factor in 
Bush v. Gore. But I have also argued that the latter is a legitimate 
one to raise under Article II when a state court resolves a dispute 
over the results of a presidential election. In Part VI, I turn to the 
question of whether the concern was serious enough in the Florida 
case to warrant federal intervention. And Part VII addresses the 
question of whether the Court should have determined the merits of 
the Article II issue. 
VI.   THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS UNDER 
THE ARTICLE II LENS 
 Florida election law provides for two basic postelection procedures 
by which a candidate may challenge the results of an election. First 
is an administrative procedure called a protest, in which a candidate 
may challenge a county canvassing board’s initial count of the votes. 
When a preliminary recount of selected precincts “indicates an error 
in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election,” 
the board may conduct a manual recount of all ballots in the 
county.110 At least ordinarily, the protest is supposed to be resolved, 
and the votes certified by the board, within seven days of the elec-
                                                                                                                    
 108. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 109. See id. at 114 (“In order to determine whether a state court has infringed upon the 
legislature’s authority, we necessarily must examine the law of the State as it existed prior 
to the action of the court.”). 
 110. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 151-52. 
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tion.111 Second is a contest, which begins only after a winner is certi-
fied. The contest is a judicial procedure in which a candidate can es-
tablish his right to an office on any of several grounds, among which 
is “[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of le-
gal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the elec-
tion.”112 The court has broad power “to provide any relief appropriate 
under such circumstances.”113 
 Secretary of State Katherine Harris refused to extend the seven-
day deadline for certification by the county boards to give the boards 
additional time to conduct manual recounts,114 and she indicated that 
voter error, including failure to punch a punch-card ballot properly, 
did not justify holding a manual recount.115 Nevertheless, on Novem-
ber 21, the state supreme court ordered her to accept returns 
through November 26, thus allowing more time for manual recounts 
in counties where Vice President Gore had requested them.116 And on 
December 8, the court ordered judicially supervised hand recounts 
throughout the state of the “undervote”—ballots that contained no 
marking registered by the counting machines in the vote for Presi-
dent.117 The first decision was reviewed and vacated in Bush I, and 
the second was reversed in Bush II. 
 In the Chief Justice’s view, the Florida Supreme Court committed 
four basic and interrelated errors that together condemn its decisions 
under Article II: (1) manual recounts were not justified by the stat-
ute, because there was not an error in the vote tabulation or a failure 
to count legal votes—difficulties with attached chads on punch-card 
ballots were attributable to voter error;118 (2) the extension of the 
time for certification disregarded the governing statute;119 (3) the de-
cision in the contest made the initial certification meaningless;120 and 
(4) the recounts jeopardized the state’s ability to take advantage of 
the “safe harbor” offered by 3 U.S.C. § 5.121 Judge Posner agrees with 
                                                                                                                    
 111. Id. § 102.111(1), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 39, at 146; id. § 102.112(1), 
amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 40, at 146-47. 
 112. Id. § 102.168(3)(c). 
 113. Id. § 102.168(8), repealed by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 44, at 154. 
 114. 00-10 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec., Letter from L. Clayton Roberts, Director, Div. of Elec. 
to Hon. Charles Burton, Chairperson, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (Nov. 13, 2000), 
available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/de00_10.html.  
 115. 00-13 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec., Letter from L. Clayton Roberts, Director, Div. of Elec. 
to Hon. Charles Burton, Chairperson, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (Nov. 13, 2000), 
available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/de00_13.html. 
 116. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000), 
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 117. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 118. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 119. Id. at 121-22. 
 120. Id. at 118. 
 121. Id. at 120-21. 
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each of these objections, except perhaps the last. With respect to each 
but the last, the alleged errors are arguably compounded by the fail-
ure of the state supreme court to defer to the discretion of other offi-
cials—the Secretary of State, the canvassing boards, and the trial 
court. I will address each of these objections in turn. 
A.   The Standard for Valid Votes and for Recounts 
1.   The Substantive Standard 
 A key premise of the Article II analysis both of the Chief Justice 
and of Judge Posner is the proposition that a punch-card ballot with-
out a hole for a single presidential candidate punched cleanly 
through, knocking the chad off, does not properly cast a vote for 
President.122 Judge Posner contends that voters were instructed to 
punch the chad cleanly through; a voter who failed to do so, there-
fore, failed to comply with instructions.123  
 From this premise, the Chief Justice and Judge Posner draw the 
conclusion that hand recounts should not have been held. As I have 
just indicated, the Florida statute governing the protest phase pro-
vides for hand recounts only if there is “an error in the vote tabula-
tion which could affect the outcome of the election;”124 though the 
language is less clear than it might be, it would appear that such an 
error is the counting of illegal votes or the failure to count legal 
votes. This is indeed the standard explicitly adopted by the contest 
statute, which authorizes relief for “[r]eceipt of a number of illegal 
votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or 
                                                                                                                    
 122. Id. at 119; POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 62 (error in tabu-
lation occurs when “the ballot contains a cleanly, completely punched-through vote for 
Gore and for no other Presidential candidate, yet the counting machine somehow failed to 
record it as a vote for Gore”); see also Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 9. 
 123. In his Supreme Court Review article, Judge Posner says:  
In the counties that used punchcard machines, not only was the voter in-
structed to punch a clean hole through the ballot (no dimples); he was also told 
to turn the ballot over after removing it from the voting machine and to make 
sure there were no bits of paper stuck to it, that is, no dangling chads. 
Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 7-8. But this is not fully accurate, because as 
pointed out below such an instruction was not given in all punch-card counties. In his 
book, Judge Posner has taken into account the county-to-county variation: 
In the counties that used punchcard machines, the voter was instructed to 
punch a clean hole through the ballot (in Broward County, for example, the in-
struction was to ‘punch the stylus straight down through the ballot card for the 
candidates or issues of your choice’). And in the two most populous of those 
counties, he was also told to turn the ballot over after removing it from the vot-
ing machine and make sure there were no bits of paper stuck to it, that is, no 
dangling chads. 
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 59. The Broward instruction, however, 
says nothing explicit about a clean hole, and, as indicated below, I do not believe it needs to 
be read as calling for one. 
 124. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 151-52. 
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place in doubt the result of the election.”125 But failure to make a 
clean hole, in the Rehnquist-Posner view, is an error by the voter; a 
ballot made in violation of instructions and lacking a clean hole is in 
their view not a legal vote and failure to count it is not an error in 
the vote tabulation.126 A corollary is that the Florida Supreme Court 
erred in its protest-phase decision of November 21,127 when it re-
quired an extension of the time for county canvassing boards to con-
duct hand recounts,128 and in its contest-phase decision of December 
8,129 when it ordered judicially supervised hand recounts throughout 
the state of the “undervote,” ballots that contained no marking regis-
tered by the counting machines as a vote for President.130 
 There is some appeal to the clean-hole standard, which puts re-
sponsibility on the voter to get it right. But I do not believe it is the 
standard provided by Florida law for what constitutes a legal vote. 
                                                                                                                    
 125. Id. § 102.168(3)(c). 
 126. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 118-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he [Florida] 
court’s interpretation of ‘legal vote,’ and hence its decision to order a contest-period re-
count, plainly departed from the legislative scheme. Florida statutory law cannot reasona-
bly be thought to require the counting of improperly marked ballots.”). Judge Posner says: 
[T]here were few if any errors in the machine tabulation of the Florida Presi-
dential votes, at least after the machine recount. . . . 
 . . . The dimpled and dangling chads discovered in the hand recounts were the 
result of voters’ either failing to follow the instructions or, if the voting machine 
itself was defective, failing to seek the assistance of one of the precinct election 
workers. 
 . . . [U]nder the Florida election code only errors in the tabulation of the vote 
authorize the canvassing board to order a complete hand recount of the 
county’s votes. . . . 
 . . . Distinguishing between errors in voting and in tabulation is important 
because the voter is complicit in the former error whereas the latter error is in-
visible to the voter. If the punchcard machine does not work and as a result the 
voter does not emerge with a fully punched-through ballot, he should know, if 
he has read the directions, that he has a spoiled ballot, and he should request a 
fresh ballot and a properly operating voting machine. 
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 86, 95, 98-99; see also Posner, Florida 
2000, supra note 2, at 18, 25-26 (virtually identical). 
 127. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), va-
cated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 128. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 95. 
If voter error, not being an error in tabulation, is not a valid ground for a com-
plete hand recount, there was no possible justification for extending the statu-
tory deadline for the submission of a county’s votes in order to permit an effort 
to recover votes from ballots rejected because of voter error. The only reason 
the county canvassing boards needed extra time was to complete the laborious 
hand recounts necessary to infer the voter’s intention from the markings on a 
ballot that the voter had spoiled . . . . 
Id.; Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 25. 
 129. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98 (2000). 
 130. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 118 (saying that the decision 
of December 8 was “a surprise,” in part because “it had become clear at the trial [of the 
contest action] that no consensus had emerged on an objective standard for recovering 
votes from a hand count of spoiled ballots”); Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 33-34. 
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 At the outset, it is important to note that the clean-hole instruc-
tion was not given in every punch-card county. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Bush made it sound as if this was 
a statewide instruction,131 but that was misleading. His source, Judge 
Tjoflat’s opinion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit dissenting from denial of preliminary relief, made clear 
that the instructions later quoted by the Chief Justice were given 
only in Palm Beach County; the Broward County instructions, also 
quoted by Judge Tjoflat, said nothing about knocking the chad off or 
checking the back of the card.132 The instructions given on the web-
site of the Broward County Supervisor of Elections now tell voters to 
knock the chads off the ballot.133 But the instructions on the website 
as it stood on Election Day did not say this, and neither did the in-
struction card given to voters in the polling place. They did say that 
the voter should “punch the stylus straight down through the ballot 
card,”134 but a voter can do that and yet leave an attached chad. Some 
of the counties using the Votomatic machines had instructions simi-
lar to those used in Palm Beach.135 Others, though, had instructions 
similar to those in Broward, without any mention of the need to clean 
chads off.136 The clean-hole standard, therefore, cannot be a statewide 
standard for determination of what constitutes a legal vote. 
 Perhaps one could attempt to resuscitate the Rehnquist-Posner 
view by stating that a valid vote is one cast in accordance with in-
structions given to the voter. It would be rather ironical for the Chief 
Justice to adopt this standard, because it would plainly require 
county-to-county variation in determination of what constitutes a 
valid vote. Beyond that, it would be overly restrictive and impossible 
to enforce if taken seriously. Officials could not, and should not, in-
validate the ballot of a Palm Beach voter for failing to check the back 
of the card for dangling chads, or the ballot of a Broward voter who 
pushed her stylus through the card at an angle rather than straight 
                                                                                                                    
 131. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 132. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1141 n.19 (11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J., 
dissenting): 
 Instructions to voters in Palm Beach County, a county that uses punch card 
technology, read: “After voting, check your ballot card to be sure your voting 
sections are clearly and cleanly punched and there are no chips left hanging on 
the back of the card.” The instructions in Broward County, also a punch card 
county, read: “To vote, hold the stylus vertically. Punch the stylus straight 
down through the ballot card for the candidates or issues of your choice.” 
 133. Broward County Supervisor of Elections website, available at http:// 
www.browardsoe.org/voting/votoinst.htm. 
 134. Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1141 n.19.  
 135. These included Collier, Hillsborough, Miami-Dade, Osceola, Pasco, Pinellas, and 
Sarasota Counties. Copies of instruction cards are on file with the author. 
 136. These included Duval, Lee, and Marion Counties. Copies of instruction cards and 
materials are on file with the author. 
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down.137 The fact is that many votes are counted without dispute 
even though the voter fails to comply with the instruction to punch a 
hole cleanly through; indeed, state law, in mandating a machine re-
count in close elections, anticipates that a second machine run of the 
ballots will count ballots that were missed on the first run because of 
attached chads. If these votes were not valid, then it would be “an er-
ror in the vote tabulation” to count them.138 One consequence would 
be that the canvassers would have to have a hand recount if for no 
other reason than to pick out and discard all ballots with attached 
chads—a silly result given that the machine had counted them and 
all or virtually all of them clearly reflected the voter’s intent. 
 One adhering to the Rehnquist-Posner view could try to navigate 
around this problem by contending that an invalid vote is one that, 
because it was cast in violation of the instructions given to the voter, 
was not tabulated by the machines. Like a simple clean-hole test, 
this more complex standard may be perfectly sound and sensible. It 
says to the voter in effect: “You really should follow instructions, and 
if you don’t you take a risk. You may get lucky, because the machine 
sometimes counts imperfect ballots.139 But if it doesn’t count yours 
because you didn’t do a good job, you have nobody to blame but your-
self.” Sensible as this standard may be, however, it would be hard to 
read it into current Florida law. 
 Certainly nothing in the election code suggests that the instruc-
tions given to voters in a particular county provide the standard for 
what constitutes a legal vote in that county, and so for what consti-
tutes an error in the vote tabulation. Those instructions, established 
                                                                                                                    
 137.  See supra note 132. 
 138. An alternative would be to say that if the voter fails to knock the chads off then 
whichever result the machine yields—counting the vote or not—should not be considered 
an error in tabulation. “Does the machine count it?” would be a plausible standard of law 
as to what is deemed a valid vote, though it is different from the instruction-based stan-
dard used by Judge Posner. It is clearly not the standard created by Florida law, however, 
and it would seem most unattractive to hold that, though the law contains a standard of 
validity incorporating considerations other than the machine response, whether the ma-
chine happens to read the ballot or not is controlling in determining whether the vote shall 
actually count. 
 Another alternative, at least superficially simpler, would be to prescribe that, whatever 
the state of the chads, a vote is valid if the machine counts it and not if it doesn’t. Such a 
rule would be tolerable, however, only if it included an exception providing that a vote 
would not be invalidated by failure of the machine to count it if the machine was broken. 
This proviso might mean that the alternative would still contain a good deal of ambiguity, 
because a party could contend that failure of the machine to mark ballots marked in a cer-
tain way demonstrates that it is broken. Nevertheless, this alternative might be a useful 
one, if punch-card ballots are to be used. But this standard was not the one created by 
Florida law. 
 139. Judge Posner acknowledges, “Some dangling-chad ballots are, as it were by happy 
accident, tabulated as votes, simply because the chad though not fully dislodged lets 
enough light through the chad hole to enable the tabulating machine to register a vote.” 
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 96 n.16 (emphasis added). 
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pursuant to legal authority but not by law, should be regarded 
merely as what they are on their face—as instructions, telling the 
voter what to do to minimize difficulty and the chance of error in 
counting the vote. For the true standard under Florida law of a legal 
vote we must search not the Palm Beach County instructions but the 
election code itself. 
 The Florida Supreme Court construed the statute reasonably by 
deriving from it the standard of whether there is “a clear indication 
of the intent of the voter.”140 True, the statute is less transparent 
than one might wish in this respect, but this standard does emerge 
with sufficient clarity.141 The statute adopts this standard explicitly 
in providing how “damaged or defective” ballots should be counted.142 
This provision at least arguably does not apply to a ballot merely be-
cause the ballot bears an attached chad rather than a clean hole143—
though if such a ballot be characterized as a “spoiled ballot,” as 
Judge Posner does persistently and rather surprisingly (is a ballot 
really “spoiled” because it has an insufficient marking?), the case for 
applicability may be rather strong. In any event, the adoption of the 
“clear indication of the intent of the voter” standard with respect to 
damaged or defective ballots is at least suggestive of an underlying 
concept of validity. The succeeding subsection of the statute 
strengthens this indication, providing, “If an elector marks more 
names than there are persons to be elected to an office or if it is im-
possible to determine the elector’s choice, the elector’s ballot shall not 
be counted for that office, but the ballot shall not be invalidated as to 
those names which are properly marked.”144 The statute also makes 
the intent of the voter determinative (without saying explicitly how 
clearly the intent must be indicated) in providing how a manual re-
count should be conducted, once the decision to conduct it has been 
                                                                                                                    
 140. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 141. One can imagine bizarre hypotheticals that press the point. Suppose that in a 
punch-card county a voter drops in the ballot box not the prescribed ballot form but a 
videocassette recording the voter signing of her preference for Gore. No matter how clearly 
the voter indicated her intent to vote for Gore, the state would presumably be justified in 
not counting the vote, because the voter intentionally did not use the method of voting pre-
scribed by the responsible election officials. I believe this case is far different from one in 
which the voter used the prescribed method but, perhaps through inadvertence or failure 
of understanding, failed to do so properly. Cf. Florida ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams, 120 So. 
310, 315 (1929) (articulating “substantial compliance” test; vote not to be counted “[w]here 
there is no semblance of an attempt on the part of a voter . . . to express a choice by making 
a [proper] mark,” but election officers may determine that an imperfect mark was intended 
to comply and so count the vote). 
 142. FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2000) (“No vote shall be declared invalid or void if there 
is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board.”). 
 143. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1266 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). 
 144. FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(6) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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made.145 This provision sets a bottom-line standard for what consti-
tutes a vote. It makes little sense to provide that the intent standard 
applies in conducting a hand recount but some other standard as to 
what constitutes a vote applies in determining whether the machines 
have erred in tabulating the vote. 
 In other words, the “error in the vote tabulation” standard should 
be applied by looking ahead to the intent standard. At least this is a 
plausible, not outlandish reading of the statute. But we should not 
stop with the face of the statute. To determine the state of Florida 
law as of Election Day, we should examine prior Florida practice and 
case law. For all their concern about postelection changes in law, nei-
ther the Chief Justice nor Judge Posner do this. Such an examination 
shows quite clearly that the prior understanding of election officials 
was in accordance with the intent standard articulated by the state 
supreme court. Failure to follow instructions (even statutory instruc-
tions) or to punch a clean hole in a punch-card ballot did not usually 
invalidate a vote;146 even if the machine failed to read the ballot, bal-
                                                                                                                    
 145. Id. § 102.166(7)(b), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 152. (“If a counting 
team is unable to determine a voter’s intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be pre-
sented to the county canvassing board for it to determine the voter’s intent.”). 
 146. In Florida ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 50-51 (Fla. 1940), the state su-
preme court said: 
 The statute . . . suggests that the cross mark “X” shall by the elector be 
placed before the name of the candidate of his choice. [Two of the ballots in 
question] fail to meet the requirements of the statute in that the cross mark “X” 
as made by the elector was placed after the name of the candidate of his choice 
[rather] than before. It cannot be said that the statute . . . is mandatory and on 
the failure of the voter to conform thereto that his said ballot should not be 
counted, and especially is this true when the cross mark “X” appears on the 
right of the name of the candidate and thereby clearly indicates his choice and 
declares the intention of the voter. The intention of the voter should be ascer-
tained from a study of the ballot and the vote counted, if the will and intention 
of the voter can be determined, even though the cross mark “X” appears before 
or after the name of said candidate.  
 Generally, the courts in construing statutes relating to elections, hold that 
the same should receive a liberal construction in favor of the citizen whose 
right to vote they tend to restrict and in so doing to prevent disfranchisement of 
legal voters and the intention of the voters should prevail when counting bal-
lots, and the placing of a cross mark “X” to the right of a name appearing on the 
ballot when the statute says that the same shall be placed before the name is 
not mandatory but at the most is formal or directory. It is the intention of the 
law to obtain an honest expression of the will or desire of the voter. 
Citations omitted. Accord Florida ex rel. Nuccio, 120 So. at 315; Darby v. Florida ex rel. 
McCollough, 75 So. 411, 421 (Fla. 1917) (stating that the lower court acted properly in re-
quiring election officials to count two decisive ballots that were marked after the object of 
the voter’s choice, rather than before as directed by statute, but “so marked as to plainly 
indicate the voter’s choice and intent . . . .”); see also Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 
262-65 (Fla. 1975): 
 At issue is whether the absentee voting law requires absolute strict compli-
ance with all its provisions, or whether substantial compliance is sufficient to 
give validity to the ballot.  
 . . . . 
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lots with attached chads were tallied in hand recounts, so long as the 
intent of the voter was indicated with sufficient clarity;147 and hand 
recounts were held in close elections even in the absence of suspicion 
of fraud because election officials recognized that the machines are 
not fully accurate in counting ballots that are imperfectly marked 
but still valid.148 
2.   Administrative Discretion 
 Even if I am right, that the intent of the voter provides the gov-
erning standard under Florida law for determining whether a vote 
has been validly cast, and whether a manual recount should be held, 
that does not end the matter. During the protest phase, the Secretary 
of State issued a series of opinions taking the position that an “error 
in the vote tabulation” means “a counting error in which the vote 
tabulation system fails to count . . . properly punched punch card bal-
lots,”149 and that “[v]oter error” does not qualify, so that failure of the 
machines to count ballots of voters who had “fail[ed] to properly fol-
low voting procedures” would not justify a manual recount.150 These 
                                                                                                                    
 In developing a rule regarding how far irregularities in absentee ballots will 
affect the result of the election, a fundamental inquiry should be whether or not 
the irregularity complained of has prevented a full, fair and free expression of 
the public will. Unless the absentee voting laws which have been violated in 
the casting of the vote expressly declare that the particular act is essential to 
the validity of the ballot, or that its omission will cause the ballot not to be 
counted, the statute should be treated as directory, not mandatory, provided 
such irregularity is not calculated to affect the integrity of the ballot or election. 
But see McAlpin v. Florida ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944) (finding that use of 
cross mark is mandatory). 
 147. Alicia Caldwell, 3 Counts; Fischer is Still Winner, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 17, 
1993, at B1 (“Generally, everyone [in four City Council races] gained a handful of votes be-
cause of closer scrutiny of ballots by hand recount. Ballots partly punched, for instance, 
would not have registered on machines. But they were counted in the hand count, if the 
voter’s intent seemed clear.”); Laura Lafay, Recount Confirms Winning Votes for Jim 
Swan, OSCEOLA SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 1990 (“Swan picked up one additional vote during the 
recount because one of the holes in a ballot was not punched sufficiently,” according to su-
pervisor of elections); cf. Jim Runnels, Cowin is Defeated by 12 Votes, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
TRIB., Sept. 6, 1990 (after hand recount, election official says, “We did our best to try and 
determine what the voter intended.”). 
 148. Lance Oliver, Stone Holds 7-Vote Lead But Faces 1 More Recount, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 6, 1990, at D1 (a ballot marked at the edge of the box was not 
counted by machine, but “[t]he hand recount caught the error”); Patricia Walsh, After Vote 
Recount, Judge Again Comes Out Ahead, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 8, 1996 (election 
official saying before recount in close election that “the computerized ballot counting sys-
tem isn’t foolproof” and that “most problems result from human error on the part of vot-
ers”). Note also the recount cases described supra note 147. 
 149. 00-11 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec., Letter from L. Clayton Roberts, Director, Div. of Elec. 
to Al Cardenas, Chairman, Republican Party of Fla. (Nov. 13, 2000), available at 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/de00_11.html.  
 150. 00-12 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec., Letter from L. Clayton Roberts, Director of Div. of 
Elec. to Hon. Jane Carroll, Broward County Supervisor of Elec. (Nov. 13, 2000), available 
at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/de00_12.html. 
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opinions did not attempt to determine precise rules as to what consti-
tuted a “properly punched punch card ballot,” but they did look to the 
voter instructions for the determination of what constitutes a valid 
vote. Thus, the Chief Justice said that the Florida Supreme Court 
“must defer to the Secretary’s interpretations.”151 Similarly, Judge 
Posner says that “her interpretation, if reasonable, is conclusive.”152 
 Even if, as a matter of Florida administrative law, the state su-
preme court should have followed the Secretary’s interpretation—a 
matter that I will question—it requires a rather unappealing jump to 
make an Article II violation out of this point. The argument is that 
the manner of selecting electors prescribed by the legislature before 
Election Day accorded interpretive discretion to the Secretary, and 
that by illegitimately overriding her exercise of discretion the court 
was making an ex post change in the manner of selection. But bear 
in mind that the Secretary’s interpretation was itself issued after 
Election Day, far outside any protective veil of ignorance. Further-
more, as I have just shown in Part VI.A.1, an interpretation treating 
compliance with instructions to voters as the measure of a valid vote, 
however sensible it may be in the abstract, is not well grounded in 
the statute. The “clear intent of the indication of the voter” standard, 
by contrast, is drawn from the language of the statute and is clearly 
in accord with prior case law and practice. If the question were which 
substantive standard—the one adopted by the Secretary or the one 
adopted by the state supreme court—better accorded with the law 
and practice established by the legislature before Election Day, the 
latter would be the better choice. Indeed, it would have been an in-
teresting question whether the Secretary’s interpretation constituted 
such a dramatic departure from the prior law as to be an Article II 
violation.153 
 Nevertheless, let us consider the question of the state supreme 
court’s obligation of deference under Florida administrative law. 
That court said that the state’s courts “will not defer to an agency’s 
opinion that is contrary to [state] law.”154 The truth is murkier and 
more complicated than either this statement or Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s “must defer” assertion suggests and seems to lie some-
where between them; the issue of how much deference the judiciary 
                                                                                                                    
 151. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 152. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 100. 
 153. A week after Election Day, the Florida Attorney General issued an opinion reach-
ing a conclusion similar to that of the state supreme court. 00-65 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 
(2000), available at http://legal1.firn.edu/ago.nsf/$defaultview. This opinion probably had 
no legal significance, and it may have been as motivated by partisan considerations as the 
Secretary of State’s interpretations. Nevertheless, it presents a powerful and persuasive 
argument that her conclusions were plainly wrong given the prior state of Florida law. 
 154. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 (Fla. 2000), 
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
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owes to administrative interpretations of law is as elusive in Florida 
law as it is in federal law. 
 The opinion cited by the Chief Justice said that: 
 [A]lthough not binding judicial precedent, advisory opinions of 
affected agency heads are persuasive authority and, if the con-
struction of law in those opinions is reasonable, they are entitled to 
great weight in construing the law as applied to that affected 
agency of government. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he judgment of officials duly charged with carrying out 
the election process should be presumed correct if reasonable and 
not in derogation of the law.155 
And one of the cases cited by the Florida Supreme Court repeated the 
principle from prior cases that the interpretation of a statute by the 
administrative entity charged with enforcing the statute “is entitled 
to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly erro-
neous or in conflict with the legislative intent of the statute.”156 A 
useful summary may be this: If a statute leaves room for a range of 
reasonable constructions, then the courts should ordinarily defer to a 
choice within that range made by the administrative entity charged 
with implementing the statute. A court should not impose its own in-
terpretation unless it concludes that this interpretation is clearly su-
perior to the one chosen by the administrative entity.157 In determin-
ing the appropriate degree of deference, a valid consideration is how 
much the interpretation requires agency expertise.158 
                                                                                                                    
 155. Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844-45 (Fla. 
1993). 
 156. Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d 1146, 1153 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Mayo 
Clinic Jacksonville v. Dep’t. of Prof’l Regulation, 625 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993)); see also Nikolits v. Nicosia, 682 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding 
deference unnecessary where administrative interpretation is “clearly erroneous”). 
 157. See, e.g., Florida v. Sun Gardens Citrus, LLP, 780 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (“If an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is merely one of several 
reasonable alternatives, it must stand even though it may not appear as reasonable as 
some other alternative.”) (quoting Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 427 So. 2d 716, 719-20 (Fla. 1983)); Sanfriel v. Dept. of Health, 749 So. 2d 525, 
527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“So long as the agency’s interpretation ‘is within the range 
of possible and reasonable’ it should be affirmed.”) (quoting Republic Media, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Transp., 714 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)); Las Olas Tower Co. v. City of 
Fort Lauderdale, 742 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (agency’s construction of a 
statute cannot stand if it “amounts to an unreasonable interpretation, or is clearly errone-
ous”); Sec’y of State v. Milligan, 704 So. 2d 152, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[J]udicial 
adherence to the agency’s view is not demanded when it is contrary to the statute’s plain 
meaning. . . .”) (quoting PAC for Equality v. Dep’t of State, 542 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1989)). 
 158. Zopf v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (if “[n]othing in 
the wording of [the statute] requires any particular expertise for purposes of interpretation 
. . . [this] ‘substantially mitigates the application of the rule calling for great deference to 
the agency’s interpretation of the statute’”) (quoting in part State Bd. of Optometry v. Flor-
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 The Florida Supreme Court overreached somewhat when it said 
that the Secretary’s interpretation of the “error in the vote tabula-
tion” standard “contravenes the plain meaning” of the statute;159 the 
statute does not have a plain meaning. But the court did not 
overreach in determining that the Secretary’s interpretation was 
clearly wrong or at least unreasonable, and beyond the bounds 
within which deference was required. That interpretation, I have 
shown, was a clear departure from prior law and practice. Moreover, 
determination of where the standards for validity of a vote were to be 
found, in the varying instructions given to voters or in the statute it-
self, is an issue of law on which administrative expertise has rela-
tively little bearing. Florida administrative law was not so crisp or 
confining that it demanded adherence to the Secretary’s interpreta-
tions in these circumstances. A fortiori, failure to adhere to those in-
terpretations—which themselves were made after the election and 
squarely in accordance with the Secretary’s partisan interests—did 
not constitute a violation of the federal constitutional principle 
against postelection lawmaking. 
 In view of the closeness of the Florida count, it was plausible that 
a sufficient number of votes to turn the election had been validly 
cast, under the standard that should have governed, but not counted 
by the machines. That is a possibility that could not be lightly ig-
nored. Neither Florida administrative law nor the Federal Constitu-
tion required the Florida Supreme Court to conclude that deference 
to the Secretary of State precluded it from taking remedial action, in 
accordance with the preexisting law and practice governing the ad-
ministration of Florida elections, to ensure that those votes would be 
counted. 
B.   Extension of the Initial Deadline 
 The Florida statute is remarkably clumsy in one respect. One sec-
tion says that if a county canvassing board fails to make its returns 
within the seven-day deadline that county “shall be ignored” by the 
Elections Canvassing Commission in determining the results of the 
election.160 The immediately succeeding section provides that such 
results “may be ignored.”161 Secretary Harris initially took the view 
that these statutes gave her no discretion to accept late returns; the 
                                                                                                                    
ida Soc. of Ophthalmology, 538 So. 2d 878, 885-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); Save St. 
Johns River v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 623 So. 2d 1193, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993) (administrative construction entitled to great weight “when it involves a matter 
of agency expertise”) (citing Dep’t of Admin. v. Moore, 524 So. 2d 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988)). 
 159. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1228. 
 160. FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 39, at 146. 
 161. Id. § 102.112(3), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 40, at 147.  
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permissive language, she said, only referred to “unforeseen circum-
stances” such as a natural disaster that might make compliance im-
possible.162 The next day, a lower court told her that she had discre-
tion to accept late-filed supplemental or corrective returns and could 
not reject them without taking account of all facts and circumstances 
that might affect that discretion.163 The day after that the Secretary 
issued a new set of guidelines as to when the seven-day deadline 
might be waived. This one was more refined than the prior one—but 
it did not allow for recounts attributable to “voter error.”164 The lower 
court accepted this statement as an adequate exercise of discretion;165 
the state supreme court did not. 
 At the very least, the statute on its face gave the Secretary discre-
tion to reject late returns. Judge Posner is correct that the state su-
preme court decision gave her decision no deference,166 as is perhaps 
most clearly indicated by the fact that the court effectively took over 
her job by laying out its own schedule for certification. Its decision is 
therefore open to criticism. But the defects of that decision do not 
amount to an Article II problem. 
 Bear in mind that the Secretary’s refusal to accept late recounts 
was based at least in part on the premise that the recounts were at-
tempts to cover for “voter error.” That conclusion, as I have shown 
above, depended on a perception of law—one with which the state 
supreme court disagreed. The court could have written a plausible 
enough opinion saying that the Secretary had committed legal error 
in her perception of what a valid vote is; that therefore her statement 
of the factors bearing on whether to accept late returns did not bear 
accurately on the case; that given the closeness of the election, the 
importance of conducting manual returns to correct machine failure 
to count valid votes, and the difficulty of conducting those returns, 
adherence to the seven-day deadline would be an abuse of discretion; 
and that she now had to exercise her discretion, properly guided, to 
determine what new deadline to set. Likely the court was in no mood 
to act with such moderation because of time pressure and because of 
the appearance of partisanship that Secretary Harris had given. But 
                                                                                                                    
 162. 00-10 Op. Div. of Elec., Letter from L. Clayton Roberts, Director, Div. of Elec. to 
Hon. Charles Burton, Chairperson, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (Nov. 13, 2000), 
available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/de00_10.html. 
 163. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713 (Fla. Leon County Ct., Nov. 
14, 2000). 
 164. Letter from Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State to Hon. Charles Burton, 
Chairperson, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http:// 
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/election2000/uscbushpbccbja1129.pdf, at 26-30. 
 165. McDermott, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1. 
 166. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 106 (“[T]he secretary of 
state’s decision not to delay the certification of the winner of the Presidential election de-
served considerable deference; it received none from the Florida supreme court . . . .”); see 
also Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 29. 
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such an opinion would have made the court look less overreaching 
than it did and yet allowed the boards to finish their counts. 
 In any event, though, the court’s November 21 decision to extend 
the boards’ deadline had little impact on its December 8 decision to 
order a statewide recount, and it is the later decision that made the 
difference, because it ordered the statewide recount that was re-
viewed in Bush II. Judge Posner argues that the earlier decision was 
important, because it allowed Broward County to complete its re-
count, thus giving Gore a net gain of 393 votes, and “[t]he difference 
might have proved decisive in the recount that the Florida supreme 
court ordered on December 8 had that recount gone through to com-
pletion.”167 The argument is self-evidently dependent on contingen-
cies that never occurred—the court-ordered recount never was com-
pleted, and there is no way of knowing whether the 393 votes would 
have been decisive. Furthermore, in light of the view that the Florida 
Supreme Court took of its power to order a statewide recount as part 
of the contest, earlier completion of the Broward recount was not a 
precondition for ultimately including a manual recount of that 
county’s undervote in the statewide tally. And ironically, in that 
light, extension of the deadline turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for 
Gore; by extending the deadline for initial certification, the state su-
preme court shortened the period for the contest, which if allowed to 
proceed to completion might have given Gore victory. In the end, it 
was not Bush who was hurt by the extension. 
C.   Rendering the Earlier Stage Meaningless 
 Both the Chief Justice and Judge Posner contend that the state 
supreme court’s order of a statewide recount of the undervote during 
the contest phase renders the earlier certification meaningless.168 As 
Judge Posner puts the point, the state supreme court, reversing the 
trial court, “ruled in effect that any doubts that might authorize a 
canvassing board to conduct a recount at the protest stage com-
pel[led] the court at the contest stage to order (in fact to conduct it-
self or under its supervision) a hand recount.”169 Having set up its 
own schedule of deadlines for the county canvassing boards to com-
plete their counts, the state supreme court now required a much 
later recount to be conducted with the courts, though lacking staff 
and experience, as the “primary vote tabulators.” “This,” says Judge 
Posner, “is all upside down.”170 
                                                                                                                    
 167. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 117; see also Posner, Florida 
2000, supra note 2, at 33. 
 168. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 169. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 119. 
 170. Id. at 119; see also Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
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 There is considerable force to the argument. As a matter of sound 
administrative procedure, one might expect the judicial role in the 
contest phase to be limited to ensuring that the canvassing boards 
and other election officials had not acted beyond the range of their 
discretion during the earlier phases of the count. 
 But the matter is not so simple. The protest operates county by 
county; only at the contest phase is a governmental entity able to 
view the situation statewide and order a statewide remedy.171 The 
contest statute also gives the court extremely broad remedial author-
ity, in contrast to the rather confined authority of the county can-
vassing boards.172 Though the contest is an adversarial proceeding, 
the court is not restrained by the parties’ requests for relief. Hence, 
the state supreme court ordered a statewide recount, a remedy that 
would have been essentially impossible beforehand, and one that 
Gore had not requested. Furthermore, all that is necessary to war-
rant relief in the contest phase is that “a number of legal votes suffi-
cient to change or place in doubt the result of the election” have been 
rejected;173 if more than that is required to qualify as “an error in the 
vote tabulation” and so justify a manual recount in the protest phase, 
such additional requirements do not apply during the contest.174 
 The state supreme court’s decision on December 8 did not pose a 
substantial danger that a candidate, knowing that he has a chance of 
getting relief in the contest, would essentially ignore the protest 
phase. Even if the protest reflected nothing more than the first of two 
bites at the apple, a candidate would not likely forsake that first bite. 
But even under the December 8 decision, the protest does have 
greater significance. Unless the results as shown by the certification 
are very close, the courts will not likely grant relief in the contest. 
And if the county boards have already competed a manual recount, 
then the December 8 decision shows that the courts are likely to ac-
cept the results of that recount. 
 The matter was not clear-cut. But the statewide election was ex-
traordinarily close, and the Florida Supreme Court was operating 
under the reasonable premise that a punch-card ballot can be legal 
notwithstanding an attached chad if it bears a clear indication of the 
intent of the voter. The court was therefore well within bounds in 
reading the contest statute as requiring not merely a review of the 
conduct of the county canvassing boards to determine whether they 
had abused their discretion but a statewide remedy to determine 
whether uncounted but legal ballots would alter the result of the 
                                                                                                                    
 171. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(2)-(3) (2000). 
 172. Id. § 102.168(8) (permitting circuit court judges to “provide any relief appropriate”), 
repealed by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 44, at 154. 
 173. Id. at § 102.168(3)(c). 
 174. Id.  
856  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:811 
 
election. Article II of the Federal Constitution did not invalidate that 
reading. 
D.   Return to the Safe Harbor 
 The Chief Justice argued that the recount ordered by the Florida 
Supreme Court on December 8 “significantly departed from the 
statutory framework in place on November 7” because it could not be 
completed by December 12; thus, the recount could not be reconciled 
with the “legislative wish”—that is language of the per curiam deci-
sion in Bush I, not of any source of Florida law—to take advantage of 
the safe harbor offered by 3 U.S.C. § 5.175 
 But possible loss of the safe harbor does not create a serious Arti-
cle II issue. This is hardly a situation in which the state supreme 
court, acting after November 7, overrode prior legislation clearly 
adopting the December 12 deadline. On the contrary, as I have al-
ready indicated in Part VI.C, the supposed legislative wish is not ex-
pressed in the Florida election code, and it was in fact read into the 
Code after November 7 by the Florida Supreme Court itself. 
 Moreover, that court never indicated an intention to carry matters 
past December 12. If the recount ordered on December 8 failed to sat-
isfy the Fourteenth Amendment, but a recount under other stan-
dards would be satisfactory, the Florida court should have had an 
opportunity to determine the impact of the December 12 deadline—
but a decision that in these circumstances that deadline must yield 
could hardly be deemed a nullification of previously established law. 
If (contrary to the holding of Bush II) the recount as ordered on De-
cember 8 was constitutionally satisfactory and the difficulty lay only 
in the looming self-imposed deadline, then the most obvious culprit 
was not the state supreme court but the United States Supreme 
Court, which halted the recount on December 9 and therefore pre-
cluded any chance of completing the count by December 12. 
E.   Summary 
 I do not mean to argue that the decision of the Florida Supreme 
Court to order a statewide recount was clearly correct as a matter of 
Florida law. The court’s interpretation of what constituted a valid 
vote was quite clearly in close accordance with the prior law and 
practice of the state. Whether a statewide recount should have been 
ordered, and what the criteria for it should have been, raise addi-
tional questions. The argument that the court should have deferred 
to the Secretary of State’s determination that incompletely punched 
ballots were not legal votes is not completely implausible. People of 
                                                                                                                    
 175. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120, 122 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
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good faith may even find it persuasive, though I wonder how they 
could after examining the preelection law and practice of Florida. In 
any event, to constitute a violation of Article II it is not enough that 
the state supreme court’s decision be wrong, or even obviously wrong 
and wrongheaded. It is a sad phenomenon that all the time we con-
front judicial decisions that meet those descriptions. Such is the law, 
such is life. For a postelection judicial decision to constitute a viola-
tion of Article II, it must be a substantial and clearly unjustifiable al-
teration of law that was established before Election Day. The deci-
sion of the Florida Supreme Court does not come close to meeting 
that description. 
VII.   HOW THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED 
 I have discussed the merits of the Article II argument. But I be-
lieve the Court never should have reached them. It never should 
have taken the case; instead, it should have left the matter to the po-
litical process prescribed by the Twelfth Amendment and by federal 
statute.176 Given that it did take the case, the Court should have held 
the Article II issue nonjusticiable, a matter committed to Congress in 
the process of counting the electoral vote pursuant to the Twelfth 
Amendment. And even if it did reach the merits of the Article II is-
sue, the availability of the political process should have informed its 
decision, counseling it that relatively light scrutiny was appropriate 
because Congressional review was available. 
A.    Justiciability 
 An argument of nonjusticiability must confront McPherson v. 
Blacker.177 There, the Court rejected an Article II challenge to Michi-
gan’s old system of electing electors by districts, and as a prelude to 
doing so it held that the matter was justiciable, not a political ques-
tion.178 The Court spoke in very broad terms, saying that, 
the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law 
or equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, and this is a case so arising, since the validity of the state 
                                                                                                                    
 176. Testifying before a House subcommittee, Justice Thomas later said, “If there was 
a way, and I speak only for myself, to have avoided getting involved in that difficult deci-
sion . . . I would have done it.” Charles Lane, 2 Justices Defend Court’s Intervention in Fla. 
Dispute, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2001, at A13. Actually, there was quite an easy way for the 
Court to have “avoided getting involved”—by not treating Governor Bush’s emergency ap-
plication for a stay as a petition for certiorari and granting it. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 
129 (“The Court should not have reviewed either [Bush I] or this case . . . .”) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); id. at 144 (“The Court was wrong to take this case.”) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 177. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 178. Id. at 23.  
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law was drawn in question as repugnant to such constitution and 
laws, and its validity was sustained.179  
But whatever the merits of the McPherson decision, the situation 
there was altogether different from that confronting the Court in 
Bush II. 
 In McPherson, the challenge concerned the state’s basic system for 
selecting electors and reached the Court before the election. Thus, in 
contrast to the 2000 case, the Court did not thrust itself into a con-
test concerning an election already held. To a considerable extent, 
then, the Court was able to operate behind a veil of ignorance, decid-
ing in the abstract what an acceptable system of selection was rather 
than arbitrating the standards for determining who actually won an 
election. This was a more seemly judicial function—one less likely to 
seem like an intrusion into politics. 
 More significantly, the timing factor affects the need for judicial 
intervention. Suppose Michigan’s system for selecting electors vio-
lated Article II. It would be a democratic disaster if the state held its 
election under that system and then Congress, in counting the elec-
toral votes, determined that the state had not made a valid selection 
of electors and therefore its votes could not be counted. But before 
the election there would be no practical way of ensuring a congres-
sional decision, and even if Congress made such a decision it would 
have dubious force. A decision by the Supreme Court was the only 
feasible method of reviewing Michigan’s system for compliance with 
Article II.180 
 Now compare the situation in Florida in 2000. The election had 
already been held in accordance with the statutory plan established 
by the Florida Legislature. The only dispute was over the results of 
that election. No judicial intervention was necessary to ensure that a 
federal authority would have the opportunity to determine the fed-
eral issues related to that dispute. Whether Florida definitively re-
solved the dispute or not, and whether its attempts at resolution 
were constrained by the Supreme Court or not, all purported certifi-
cates reciting its electoral votes would be transmitted pursuant to 
                                                                                                                    
 179. Id. 
 180. The Secretary of State in McPherson argued that the matter was not justiciable in 
part because any decision of the Supreme Court was subject to political review, ultimately 
in Congress. Id. The Court did not respond squarely to this argument. It is true that theo-
retically Congress might have disagreed with the Court’s decision holding the system for 
selection of electors valid, and at least arguably Congress would not be bound by that deci-
sion. But if the Court held the system invalid and enjoined it, then no electors would be 
chosen under that system and there would be nothing for Congress to review. In other 
words, though the Court’s decision could not altogether eliminate the possibility that the 
state would elect a slate of electors that Congress would later determine to be invalid, it 
could at least narrow that possibility and do so in a way not subject to congressional re-
view. 
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the Twelfth Amendment to Washington, D.C., and directed to the 
President of the Senate. That Amendment further directs, “[t]he 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall 
then be counted.”181 
 Note that the Amendment—which in this respect is substantially 
identical to the original Article II—does not say that the certificates 
shall be directed to the Chief Justice of the United States, and that 
the Chief Justice shall open them in the presence of the Supreme 
Court and they shall then be counted. The constitutional decision to 
repose the responsibility for counting the vote within the national 
legislature rather than with the judiciary was not adventitious. It 
seems plain that this is “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” sup-
porting the conclusion that the matter was a nonjusticiable political 
question.182 
 Certainly Congress has always understood that the sole responsi-
bility for determining the electoral vote is lodged within it. The crisis 
of 1876-77 was attributable in large part to the fact that the Twelfth 
Amendment is ambiguous about exactly where the power to count 
the vote for the Presidency is lodged—in the President of the Senate, 
in the two Houses acting concurrently, in the two Houses acting as 
one body, or in the House of Representatives alone. But there does 
not seem to have been any serious thought that the power rested 
outside Congress, or that the Supreme Court should decide the vari-
ous disputes over the credentials of state electors.183 As the House 
committee reporting the bill that eventually became the Electoral 
Count Act of 1887 said, 
 The two Houses are, by the Constitution, authorized to make the 
count of electoral votes. They can only count legal votes, and in do-
ing so must determine, from the best evidence to be had, what are 
                                                                                                                    
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 182. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Thus, I do not believe the justiciability is-
sue is much affected whether the substantive argument is phrased in terms of due process 
or Article II. In either case, the objection is postelection lawmaking, and in either case its 
resolution is committed—in the context of a presidential election—to Congress. But even 
assuming the due process claim was justiciable, the prudential reasons counseling against 
Supreme Court intervention apply as fully to it as to the Article II claim. 
 183. Five members of the Court did sit on the Electoral Commission that helped to 
solve the crisis by rendering presumptive decisions in the cases of challenged electors. That 
Commission, however, was a creation of Congress, the other ten of its members were mem-
bers of Congress, it only acted on matters referred to it under the terms of the statute, and 
the two Houses of Congress reserved the power, acting concurrently, to overrule the Com-
mission’s decisions. 
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legal votes. . . . The power to determine rests with the two houses, 
and there is no other constitutional tribunal.184 
 By 2000, though, the Supreme Court seems to have concluded 
that only it could save the nation from chaos, and Judge Posner 
agrees.185 Both the constitutional commitment to Congress and the 
statutory mechanism created by the 1887 Act remain in place—but 
the Court had too little faith in them to allow them to work. 
B.   The Statutory Framework 
 Congress passed the Electoral Count Act186 to try to ensure that it 
could resolve future crises in a more orderly way. It is instructive to 
examine how the Act operates in general and would have operated in 
this presidential election had the Supreme Court not shut the proc-
ess down; thus we may find the path that the Supreme Court cut off. 
The wording and structure of the statute are muddy, but its basic op-
eration is clear enough. 
 Most often, the statute operates under one basic rule: If there is 
just one return from a state, its electors have been lawfully certified, 
and the votes were “regularly given” by the electors, then those votes 
may not be rejected; the two Houses may, however, reject votes, even 
if those votes are the only ones from the state, if the Houses agree 
that the votes were not regularly given by electors whose votes have 
been lawfully certified.187 
 If there are multiple returns, a more complicated set of rules 
comes into play. First, the “safe harbor” provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5 may 
apply: If the state has provided, by laws enacted prior to Election 
Day, “for its final determination of any controversy or contest con-
cerning the appointment of . . . electors, . . . by judicial or other 
methods or procedures,” and that determination is made at least six 
days prior to the date prescribed for the electors to meet, then that 
determination “shall be conclusive . . . in the counting of the electoral 
votes.”188 
                                                                                                                    
 184. H.R. REP. NO. 49-1638, at 2 (1886) (report submitted by Rep. Caldwell, Select 
Committee on the Election of President and Vice President), quoted in Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98, 154 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 185. He asks: 
[W]hat exactly is the Supreme Court good for if it refuses to examine a likely 
constitutional error that if uncorrected may engender a national crisis? We 
might call this the reverse political questions doctrine. Political considerations 
in a broad, nonpartisan sense will sometimes counsel the Court to abstain, but 
sometimes to intervene. 
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 162; Posner, Florida 2000, supra note 
2, at 53. 
 186. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. § 5.  
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 The statute further provides for the contingency in which “there 
shall arise the question which of two or more . . . authorities . . . is 
the lawful tribunal” of the state designated by § 5.189 In that case if 
the two Houses, voting separately, concurrently decide that the valid-
ity of one slate “is supported by the decision of such State so author-
ized by its law,” then the votes of that slate shall be counted.190 
 But if there has not been a § 5 determination—and presumably if 
competing tribunals claim to have made a § 5 determination but the 
Houses do not agree on one—then the votes shall be counted of a 
slate that the two Houses agree “were cast by lawful electors ap-
pointed in accordance with the laws of the State”; provided, however, 
that even though the Houses agree that the slate was lawfully ap-
pointed, they might agree that their votes were not regularly given, 
in which case the votes should not be counted.191 Finally, if the two 
Houses fail to agree as to which slate was lawfully appointed, then 
the default rule is that “the votes of the electors whose appointment 
shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal 
thereof, shall be counted.”192 
 This complex procedure may seem to invite endless wrangling; 
that prospect is a concern raised by Judge Posner.193 In fact, however, 
the statute provides tight time limits designed to ensure that the 
count will be brought to a prompt conclusion.194 
C.   Constitutionality of the Statutory Framework 
 I will not dwell long on the question of whether the statutory 
framework I have just outlined is constitutional. It seems to me that 
a constitutional challenge almost certainly would have failed. 
 As noted above, Congress passed the Electoral Count Act in the 
wake of the crisis of 1876-77, and with the hopes of preventing a 
similar crisis and confusion of the type that had arisen in prior in-
stances of dispute electoral votes. The Act operated in the context of 
bare-bones and relatively uninformative constitutional language that 
had proven inadequate to the task. In a moment of relative political 
quiet—operating behind a veil of ignorance—Congress adopted a 
                                                                                                                    
 189. Id. § 15.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. The statute is uninformative as to the meaning of “regularly given.” I assume, 
for example, that votes, although cast by lawfully appointed electors, would not be regu-
larly given if they were not cast on the date designated by law, or if they were cast outside 
a meeting held within the state as required by the Twelfth Amendment. 
 192. Id. 
 193. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 137-41; Posner, Florida 2000, 
supra note 2, at 44-45. Among other points, Judge Posner suggests that a battle in Con-
gress might have resulted in Strom Thurmond or Lawrence Summers acting as President. 
 194. 3 U.S.C. §§ 17, 18 (1994). 
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procedure designed to elaborate on the constitutionally prescribed 
processes and minimize the probability of future difficulties. 
 It was entirely fitting for Congress to do this. Not only is Congress 
the national legislature, but the power in question—the power to de-
cide which electoral votes shall be counted—clearly resides within 
Congress itself. Occasionally, the President of the Senate had as-
serted the power, because it is he who is constitutionally designated 
to receive and open the returns, but that argument seems flimsy. 
More likely it is the House of Representatives, because the House 
chooses the President if no candidate receives a majority of electoral 
votes, or the two Houses concurrently, because it is in front of both 
that the electoral votes are opened, or conceivably the two Houses 
deemed to be acting as one body, on a one-member, one-vote basis. In 
passing the statute, then, Congress was allocating within itself 195 
power that belonged to it but the constitutional allocation of which 
was unclear. 
 Perhaps one might argue that, Congress not having been given an 
explicit grant of authority to fill in the rules governing the electoral 
count, any elaboration on the constitutional procedures should be by 
constitutional amendment. But the argument is unpersuasive. The 
nation should not have to reach constitutional agreement on the fine-
grained mechanical issues addressed by the Electoral Count Act. To 
say that, absent a constitutional amendment, there can be no law 
clarifying the allocation of power in conducting the electoral count is 
to abandon serious hope of adopting any such law. And even if a con-
stitutional amendment would be practical and preferable, a deci-
sionmaker—especially a pragmatic decisionmaker of the type Judge 
Posner praises—in the midst of a crisis would have to consider the 
simple fact that the nation has not adopted such an amendment. If a 
live electoral dispute had gone to Congress in 2000 and the dispute 
were to be resolved according to rules previously prescribed, then 
those rules would have to be the ones laid out long before by the 
Electoral Count Act. It was the only rule book in town. 
 Furthermore, the Act has, for over a century, governed routine 
electoral counts without any dispute as to its constitutionality. Such 
accretions of authority in undisputed cases must count for something 
when the Act is finally put to the test in a disputed case. 
 In any event, it was always highly unlikely that the 2000 election 
dispute would yield a judicial decision that the Act is unconstitu-
tional. As Judge Posner suggests, the Supreme Court presumably 
would have held a challenge to the Act—an attempt to restrain Con-
gress in conducting the constitutionally prescribed count—
                                                                                                                    
 195. The statute, like all federal statutes, was presented to the President, but I do not 
believe that materially altered the situation. 
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nonjusticiable. It is possible that some members of Congress would 
have contended in debate that the Act is unconstitutional, or that it 
only carries the force of rules of the two Houses, and so could be dis-
regarded by one House or the other. But such a contention would 
have appeared transparently to be an attempt to change the rules in 
the middle of the game, and it would have entailed a steep political 
price. 
 I will therefore assume that the process prescribed by the Elec-
toral Count Act is constitutional and would have been generally re-
garded as binding had the dispute continued into Congress. Now let 
us see how this process might have worked in the 2000 election. I 
will run through it under two alternative counterfactual assump-
tions. 
D.   If There Had Been a § 5 Determination 
 First, suppose that the Court decided not to review the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision of December 8, and that the statewide re-
counts and the contest proceeding of which they were a part were 
concluded by December 12. Then, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5, the de-
termination made by the Florida court at the conclusion of that pro-
ceeding should have been conclusive in the count of the electoral 
vote. 
 If the court had determined that Bush was the winner, presuma-
bly there would have been no problem—he would have received Flor-
ida’s electoral votes, and the Presidency, without further dispute. 
But how much more satisfying an outcome that would have been—
the recount ordered by the state supreme court completed without 
federal interference and the election awarded to the winner of that 
count—than the one we have. 
 If the court had determined that Gore was the winner, however, 
that likely would not have been the end of the story. If the legislature 
had gotten into the act by designating its own slate, that should not 
have had any impact; as I have shown in Part II, the legislature had 
no postelection authority to designate a slate. Presumably, though, 
the Governor, Jeb Bush, the Republican candidate’s brother, would 
not have altered certification of the Republican slate even if the state 
supreme court ordered him to do so; in a functional family, spending 
a few weeks in jail is probably a reasonable price to pay to give your 
brother a good chance for the Presidency. That court would not have 
had to play a game of chicken, however. It could have reached its fi-
nal determination and, relying on § 5, sent certification of that de-
termination to Washington. Thus, two competing returns would be 
opened in Congress, one of a slate certified by the Governor and the 
other supported by what purported to be a § 5 determination. 
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 Now, Republicans in Congress may have resisted the conclusion 
that the final judgment of the state supreme court was a determina-
tion satisfying § 5. Recall that as of January 6, 2001, while the De-
mocrats had the narrowest of edges in the Senate—with the Presi-
dent of the Senate, Al Gore himself, in position to break a 50-50 tie—
the Republicans had a slightly larger edge in the House. House Re-
publicans would have had the incentive to deny § 5 treatment to the 
determination by the state supreme court, because eventually that 
would have meant that the default rule, counting the slate certified 
under seal by the Governor, would apply. Republicans may thus have 
contended, for reasons addressed in Part VI, that the court’s decision 
did not accord with preexisting law. And, for reasons similar to those 
I have presented in Part VI, such a contention would not have been 
sound on the merits. Apart from that, however, Congress should not 
have reached the merits of that contention, or if it did it should have 
considered them with a thumb heavily on the side of the scale favor-
ing legitimacy of the state supreme court’s decision. 
 To see this, it is helpful to understand the basic nature of § 5. This 
provision is not addressed in general to a state’s postelection count-
ing procedure. Rather, it is addressed to the state’s procedure for its 
“final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the ap-
pointment of” the state’s electors.196 Failure to appreciate that dis-
torted much of the discussion during the election affair, including the 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Bush I. The statute 
presupposes a “controversy or contest” and tells the state that if it 
provides a method for “final determination” of that dispute, and that 
determination is made at least six days before the electors vote, then 
the determination will be conclusive in Congress’s counting of the 
electoral vote.197 The county-by-county administrative protests pur-
suant to section 102.166 of Florida’s election code that were on re-
view in Bush I cannot be that “final determination”; indeed, at that 
point, no “contest or controversy” had ripened concerning appoint-
ment of the state’s electors, because no statewide authority had certi-
fied a winner. It is clear that the “final determination” of the “contest 
or controversy” is not made under Florida law by an administrative 
protest. Rather, it is made by the judicial procedure established by 
section 102.168, which is even explicitly termed a “contest,” which 
begins only after an administrative certification is made, and which 
is the state’s last word on who won the election.198 
                                                                                                                    
 196. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Nevertheless, in Bush I, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that “a legislative 
wish to take advantage of the ‘safe harbor’ would counsel against any construction of the 
Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law.” Bush v. Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000). But section 5 does not call into question 
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 The idea behind § 5, then, is that if there arises a “contest or con-
troversy” that may result in multiple slates of electors voting, but the 
state makes a timely “final determination” of the controversy in ac-
cordance with a previously established procedure, the state will then 
be treated as a black box; even if multiple slates do vote, Congress 
will not look behind that determination but will accept its results. 
Given this, it does not make sense for Congress to be persnickety 
about whether the precise procedure used by the tribunal or the sub-
stantive result that it reaches is in accordance with state law. Note 
that § 15 provides an explicit procedure for Congress to determine 
“which of two or more . . . authorities . . . is the lawful tribunal” for 
purposes of § 5.199 But it does not provide an explicit procedure for 
Congress to determine that the procedures followed by what is con-
cededly the “lawful tribunal”—the state supreme court in this case—
or the result reached by it do not square with state law. As did the 
Electoral Commission in 1877, Congress no doubt realized that it is 
an unfortunate result if Congress itself has to resolve questions of 
state law in determining the electoral vote. “Pick your final deci-
sionmaker,” Congress effectively told the states in the 1887 Act, “and 
if it comes up with a timely decision we will not look behind its de-
termination.” Not a mere black box can the state become, but one 
with a very hard casing. 
 Thus, for example, Congress should not decide that the state con-
test-resolution procedure fails to qualify under § 5 because the court 
previously shortened the time for it by extending the earlier adminis-
trative phase of the dispute. This does not necessarily mean that, if 
the designated tribunal were effectively to select electors itself with-
out regard to the procedure established by the legislature before the 
election, Congress would be powerless to do anything about it. At 
some point, Congress might conclude that the tribunal had acted in 
so lawless a way that the result it produced should be considered not 
a determination of the contest but rather a coup. But plainly this 
conclusion would be warranted only in extreme cases—and nothing 
the Florida Supreme Court did after the 2000 election, or was likely 
to do if the recounts continued, was so extreme. 
 This seems an appropriate structure for decision, for as I have in-
dicated in Part V in discussing the structure of an Article II claim, 
only in extreme cases should the decision of the state tribunal pose a 
constitutional problem. Perhaps, though, the statute should be con-
strued not to give Congress the power to break into the black box at 
                                                                                                                    
“any construction of the Election Code” that might be deemed a change in law. It only ap-
plies to the proceeding established for final resolution of a contest, and that proceeding was 
not on review in Bush I. 
 199. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). 
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all and reject a decision made by the designated tribunal. That is not 
particularly troublesome as a constitutional matter. Ultimately, if 
civil order is to be maintained, there must be some entity whose de-
termination of the results of a state’s election is conclusive, and we 
must hope that that entity will perform its duty and not exercise its 
power lawlessly. State judges are bound to follow the Constitution.200 
The determination of the results of a state’s election depends princi-
pally, if not exclusively, on determinations of state law. It makes per-
fect sense for Congress, in exercising its power of counting the elec-
toral vote, to devolve the authority to resolve a contest in a given 
state upon the tribunal designated by that state. 
 Whether such arguments would have carried the day in Congress 
it is hard to say. But they would have had legal force, and that would 
have created political force. Perhaps in the end, notwithstanding the 
results of the recount and its certification by the state supreme court, 
House Republicans would have denied § 5 treatment to that certifica-
tion. George W. Bush would still have been elected President, and 
the result would still have appeared to many, as it did in the actual 
event, to be a usurpation of power. But at least it would have been an 
exercise of power taken in the face of, rather than precluding, the re-
count, and it would have been effected by members of the govern-
ment acting without any pretense that they were not politicians. 
E.   Recounts Without a § 5 Determination 
 Now suppose that the recount had been completed, but not in time 
for a resolution under § 5. This might have occurred if the Supreme 
Court had never stopped the recount, either because it declined to 
take Bush II on review or because it never issued a stay, but the 
state failed to meet the December 12 deadline. Or, bringing the case 
closer to the actual events, it could have occurred if the Court re-
manded the case to the state supreme court and allowed the recount 
to continue under standards that the Court deemed constitutionally 
appropriate. 
 Once again, if Bush had won the recount under judicial supervi-
sion, that presumably would have been the end of the matter. And 
once again, that would have been a satisfying result. Democrats 
could not complain about judicial usurpation if the recount they had 
sought showed their ticket to be a loser. 
 Again, the more interesting and complex case is the one in which 
Gore wins the recount. Again, I assume that in this case there would 
have been competing certificates presented to Congress, one for Re-
publican electors under seal by the Governor, and another for De-
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mocratic electors from the state supreme court, in addition, perhaps, 
to an illegitimate certificate for a Republican slate from the legisla-
ture. But now by hypothesis the judicial certificate would not satisfy 
the safe harbor of § 5, and Congress would have no legal compulsion 
to accept it. Now the Republicans would have a clear advantage, for 
if the two Houses did not agree that one slate was the legitimate one, 
the default provision would apply in favor of the slate certified by the 
Governor. 
 But the result would not have been open and shut. Suppose the 
recount was widely perceived to be fair, and that it revealed a fairly 
substantial margin in favor of the Democratic ticket—say a few 
thousand votes rather than dozens or hundreds. Then, especially in 
light of the fact that the Democrats won the popular vote nationwide, 
there might have been substantial pressure on some Republican 
members of the House, particularly those from marginal districts, to 
accept the results of the recount. It would only have taken a small 
handful of crossover votes to elect the Gore-Lieberman ticket. Per-
haps even those few votes would not have been forthcoming. Which-
ever way the proceedings in Congress turned out, however, our 
President and Vice President would have been elected as they always 
have been—by open politics. 
CONCLUSION 
 Judge Posner contends that “Congress is not a competent forum 
for resolving such disputes” as the one over Florida’s electoral 
votes.201 He recognizes that resolving conflicts is much of what legis-
latures are all about, but he says that “disputes over the lawfulness 
of competing slates of Presidential electors call for legal-type judg-
ments rather than for raw exercises of political power.”202 Several re-
sponses are appropriate. 
 First, it is not self-evident that Bush v. Gore was not a raw exer-
cise of political power. Second, given that Judge Posner defends Bush 
v. Gore not as a clearly correct legal decision but as a pragmatic act 
of judicial statesmanship, his contention that because of its legal na-
ture the decision ought to have resided in the judiciary of the issues 
is quite ironic. Third, that Congress is a political and highly partisan 
body does not mean it is incapable of following rules. Congress’s own 
procedures are controlled by elaborate procedural rules. If either 
party had sought a departure from the rules laid out more than a 
century ago for resolution of disputes over electors, it would have 
paid a heavy price. Fourth, in some cases the resolution of a dispute 
over electors is rather clear as a matter of law. But in others it is not, 
                                                                                                                    
 201. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 2, at 145. 
 202. Id. 
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and so ultimately it is probably better, when a presidential election 
depends on such disputes, that they be resolved by openly political 
actors. Finally, for better or worse, Congress is clearly the forum that 
the Constitution chose to resolve these disputes. 
 It was five weeks after Election Day when the Supreme Court 
brought the dispute to a close. Had the political process prescribed by 
the Constitution and by federal law been allowed to run its course, 
the dispute might (depending on the result of the recount) have gone 
on another three and a half weeks, perhaps a little more. The transi-
tion period, after the clear emergence of a winner, might have been 
reduced to two weeks, perhaps even less. That surely would have 
been a cost of continuing with the process. But it would not have 
compared to the cost to democracy that we actually incurred, in 
which our highest court, at some presumed loss to its own credibility, 
halted the prescribed process for determining the electoral votes and 
effectively declared the contest over. 
 Perhaps such a cost would be worthwhile if it were truly neces-
sary to maintain order and unity. But there is no warrant for con-
cluding that chaos was threatened if the matter had remained in 
doubt for a few more weeks. The Constitution and federal statute 
provide a political process for counting the electoral vote, because the 
selection of the President and the Vice President is a quintessentially 
political function. Had the process continued, it would have been 
highly contentious and partisan, and even bitter, but it would not 
have led to bloodshed or secession or even a delay in inauguration. 
The culmination of that process occurs in Congress, the national leg-
islature. Each state is given an opportunity to resolve its own dis-
putes, and the state may choose, as Florida has done, to make its su-
preme court the ultimate tribunal for that resolution. But the United 
States Supreme Court has at most a peripheral role in the process, 
and not one explicitly provided by Article II, the Twelfth Amend-
ment, or by statute. If a state genuinely discriminates against some 
of its voters, the Court’s intervention might be warranted. But the 
Court must be extremely careful, lest it usurp the functions of the 
voters, of the states, and of the Congress. 
 In this case, the Court’s intervention was unjustified. We should 
recognize that manual recounts under subjective standards are trou-
bling, even if state law calls for them. And it is easy enough to see 
how an observer, particularly one hoping for a Republican victory, 
would conclude that the state supreme court overreached its author-
ity and gave insufficient deference to the Secretary of State. But that 
court was the designated tribunal for providing the state’s resolution 
of the contest over its electoral votes and, even assuming that the 
Supreme Court had any power of review at all over the state court’s 
determinations, that power should be reserved for egregious cases. 
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That description does not come close to fitting the state court’s at-
tempt, in accordance with prior law, to count ballots that bore a clear 
indication of voter intent but were not counted by machine. 
 I continue, then, to believe that the decision in Bush v. Gore was a 
terrible mistake, an unsupportable intrusion into our democracy. 
Confronted with the contrary conclusion of observers like Judge Pos-
ner, I am compelled to conclude that, strongly held as one’s views on 
this case may be, it is possible for others, approaching the matter 
from a different perspective, to reach a decision that may appear 
wrongheaded and unsupportable, but to do so in good faith. Thus, all 
one can do is acknowledge the authority of those in a position to de-
cide the matter definitively and live with the result. But I cannot for-
get that this is precisely the attitude that the Supreme Court should 
have taken in this case. And so I still find it hard to make a full 
peace with Bush v. Gore. 
